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ARTICLES
Justice Rehnquist and the Dismantling of Environmental Law
by James R. May and Robert L. Glicksman
Editors’Summary: Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist was uniquely situated to
have a profound impact on the development of federal environmental
law—both because of the overlap of his tenure with the development of the field
of environmental law and because of his four-decade tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court, more than one-half of which was as Chief Justice. Before his
death on September 3, 2005, Rehnquist heard the vast majority of the Court’s
environmental cases during the modern environmental era, penning opinions
in 25% of them, and affording him an opportunity to shape environmental law,
especially during its formative years, that no Justice is likely to match. This Article discusses how Justice (and then Chief Justice) Rehnquist interpreted federal constitutional and public law in the opinions he wrote in environmental
cases. It concludes that Rehnquist’s environmental opinions reflect a threetiered agenda. First, if a case involved a constitutional or statutory property
rights question, Justice Rehnquist almost always chose to protect property
rights over competing environmental concerns. Second, in the absence of a
property rights issue, Rehnquist almost always decided cases so as to protect
state sovereignty, sometimes but not invariably with pro-environmental results.
Third, in cases lacking a property rights or state sovereignty component, he almost always decided them in a way that curtailed federal power, and with it, the
effectiveness of environmental law. The Article, which is part of a larger ongoing study of Justice Rehnquist’s environmental law jurisprudence, explores the
extent to which Justice Rehnquist’s three-tiered approach has already weakened environmental law and whether that approach is likely to contribute to
further diminishment of effective environmental protection under the pollution
control and natural resource management legislation in the future.
“[T]he requirements of the Clean Air Act Amendments
virtually swim before one’s eyes . . . .” U.S. Steel Corp. v.
EPA, 444 U.S. 1035, 1038-39, 10 ELR 20081 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
“The Court errs in substantial measure because it refuses
to acknowledge that a safe and attractive environment is
the commodity really at issue. . . .” Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 349, 22 ELR 20909
(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

James R. May is a Professor of Law at the Widener University School of
Law, and a Visiting Scholar at the Environmental Law Institute (ELI). He
would like to thank Prof. Robert Percival for inviting him to present this
paper as part of the faculty development series at the University of Maryland School of Law, Scott Schang and Leslie Carothers of ELI for inviting
him to present the paper as part of the ELI’s seminar series, and Jay Austin
for comments on a draft version.
Robert L. Glicksman is the Robert W. Wagstaff Professor of Law at the
University of Kansas. He would like to thank Prof. Richard Lazarus for inviting him to present this Article as part of his environmental law seminar
series at Georgetown University Law Center and to all of those who provided feedback on the presentation.

I. Introduction
William H. Rehnquist left an indelible imprint on the law in
the four decades he served on the U.S. Supreme Court, first
as an Associate Justice, and then as the nation’s 16th Chief
Justice. Nominated by President Richard M. Nixon on October 11, 1971,1 he served as an Associate Justice from 1972
until President Ronald W. Reagan elevated him to Chief
Justice in 1986. Rehnquist was uniquely situated to have a
profound impact on the development of federal environmental law—both because of the overlap of his tenure with
the development of the field of environmental law and because of his long tenure on the Court. His appointment corresponds almost exactly with the birth of modern federal
environmental law, marked by the passage of formative
environmental legislation such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)2 in 1969 and the Clean Air Act
1. For the story behind his nomination, see John Dean, The
Rehnquist Choice (2001).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370d, ELR Stat. NEPA §§2-209.
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(CAA)3 in 1970. During his tenure as Associate Justice, the
U.S. Congress enacted or substantially amended nearly all
of the nation’s bedrock environmental bills, both in the pollution control and natural resource management fields.
Justice Rehnquist was something of a workhorse in the
field. He participated in 90% of the nearly 280 environmental law cases the Court has decided since the dawn of the
modern environmental era.4 He sat on nearly all environmental cases decided after 1971, or roughly 250 of them, including 100 as Chief Justice. As the only Justice who was on
the Court during its consideration of every modern environmental law case to come before it between 1971 and his
death on September 3, 2005, Rehnquist wrote more opinions—84—in environmental cases than any other Justice.5
Justice Rehnquist considered himself a westerner who
enjoyed the great outdoors. He and his family owned a summer cottage in Vermont’s Green Mountains. He socialized,
in majestic settings, with environmental stalwart Justice
William O. Douglas.6 He fished with Justice Robert H. Jackson, for whom he clerked. Yet Rehnquist seemed agnostic
and, at times, even hostile toward modern federal environmental law. He regarded environmental law as at best “a
specialty all its own.”7 At worst, it was a nuisance, resulting
in “protracted litigation” that bespeaks unwarranted expansion of the federal judiciary,8 and clogs federal courts,
thereby distracting them from more important business.9 He
disdained what he called “harsh and draconian” environmental programs, such as the CAA, the requirements of
which, he said, “virtually swim before one’s eyes.”10 He
seldom deferred to the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA’s) interpretation of federal environmental
laws. He published four books and numerous articles, but
managed to avoid the subject altogether. His popular account of the Supreme Court does not discuss the seven times
he vigorously dissented from majority opinions that struck
down “pro-environmental” state laws under the dormant
Commerce Clause.11
Rehnquist’s approach to environmental cases did not
seem to soften through the years. As an Associate Justice, he
3. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat. CAA §§101-618.
4. See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 703, 708
(2000) [hereinafter Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental];
Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 19 Pace L. Rev. 619 (2002); Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Three Years Later, 19 Pace
L. Rev. 653 (2002).
5. He wrote majority, concurring, dissenting, and per curiam opinions
40, 12, 30, and 2 times, respectively.
6. Rehnquist fondly recalled spending “several delightful days” with
Justice Douglas and his wife at their summer retreat in Goose Prairie,
Washington. William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court 226
(2001). Rehnquist called Douglas “a conservationist long before it
became fashionable to be one, and his efforts were instrumental in
bringing the C&O Canal into the National Park System.” Id. at 178.
7. William H. Rehnquist, Remarks Made at Temple University School
of Law Centennial and Convocation, 69 Temple L. Rev. 645, 652
(1996).
8. William H. Rehnquist, Soluble Problems for the Federal Judiciary:
Curtailing the Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction and Other Matters,
35 Ct. Rev. 4 (1998).
9. William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National Mass Tort
Conference, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1523 (1995).
10. U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 444 U.S. 1035, 1038-39, 10 ELR
20081 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
11. See Rehnquist, supra note 6.

8-2006

aggressively used federalism as a justification for limiting
the reach of federal environmental law.12 After he became
Chief Justice, Rehnquist spoke of environmental law with
increasing skepticism. Deploring the “boring nature of work
assigned to young associates in large firms,” in remarks he
made at a law school dedication, he said, “You don’t become an environmental lawyer now, or a Clean Water Act
[(CWA)]13 lawyer, but a Section 404 [CWA] Lawyer.”14
Predictably, then, more often than not Rehnquist voted
against environmental protection interests. According to
Prof. Richard Lazarus, Rehnquist’s “Environmental Protection” score is about 36%, one of the three lowest in the modern federal environmental law era.15
Given Rehnquist’s longevity and leadership on the Court,
and the possibility that his views will continue to influence
the Justices (particularly the more conservative ones) for decades to come, we believe it is worth exploring in some
depth not only how Justice Rehnquist voted in environmental cases, but also the analysis reflected in the opinions he
wrote. We conclude that Rehnquist’s opinions demonstrate
that he was highly invested in curtailing federal power, promoting state prerogatives, and protecting private property
rights. Our analysis supports the conclusion that Rehnquist
favored environmental protection legislation or regulation
only to the extent that doing so was consistent with these
values, which turned out to be seldom.
Part II of this Article analyzes Rehnquist’s penchant for
construing the constitutional and statutory aspects of environmental cases so as to curtail federal power. Here we explore how Rehnquist tried to reinvigorate the nondelegation
doctrine, narrow the reach of federal regulatory power under the Commerce Clause, and apply tools of statutory construction to limit the scope of environmental legislation.
Rehnquist seems to have been committed to the narrowing
of federal authority in pollution control and natural resource
management cases even in situations in which doing so did
not result in an expansion of state power.
Part III discusses how Rehnquist sought to protect state
sovereignty through constitutional interpretation and statutory construction in environmental cases. His opinions limited the constraints placed on state power by the dormant
Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause and interpreted environmental statutes, particularly those pertaining
to natural resource management, so as to promote state authority to control activities with potential adverse environ12. Prof. Robert V. Percival has asserted that “Rehnquist was intellectually consistent in his defense of federalism, voting in favor of
states when their efforts to promote environmental protection were
challenged as violative of the Commerce Clause or federal legislation promoting nuclear power.” Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights From the Marshall Papers, 23 ELR 10606, 10622 (Oct. 1993) [hereinafter Percival, Marshall Papers].
13. 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387, ELR Stat. FWPCA §§101-607.
14. Carlos Santos, Rehnquist Chides Legal Profession; Remarks Come
at U. Va. Law School Dedication, Richmond Times-Dispatch,
Nov. 9, 1997, at C3.
15. Prof. Richard J. Lazarus gives Justice Rehnquist an “Environmental Protection” or “EP” score of 36.5, that is, that he voted in favor
of a pro-environmental outcome in 36.5% of what Lazarus identifies as the Court’s most environmental cases up to 1998 (40 out of
114). Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental, supra note 4, at
725, 729, 812. Controlling for the dormant Commerce Clause cases
discussed infra at Section III.A.2. would take his EP to about 30 (33
out of 107).

Copyright © 2006 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

8-2006

NEWS & ANALYSIS

mental effects. This aspect of Rehnquist’s environmental
jurisprudence did not always redound to the detriment of environmental protection. Rather, when environmental protection objectives aligned with his federalism agenda of protecting a state’s authority to protect its own resources
against external threats, Rehnquist favored the retention of
state power, as he consistently did in his dissenting opinions
in the dormant Commerce Clause cases.
Part IV explains Rehnquist’s strong commitment to the
protection of private property rights in environmental cases,
both through his resolution of questions arising under the
Takings Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution and through his interpretation of federal statutes that had the potential to impinge on private
property rights. It also explores how Rehnquist reacted
when the state sovereignty and private property rights
components of his agenda came into potential conflict. The
cases demonstrate that Rehnquist tended to be willing to
sacrifice state autonomy upon the altar of private property
rights protection.
In each of the three main parts of this Article, the discussion follows the same structure: a section analyzing Rehnquist’s use of constitutional law doctrines to limit federal
power, protect state sovereignty, or protect private property
rights; a section analyzing Rehnquist’s resolution of statutory issues to accomplish the same goals; and a final section
discussing the significance of the cases in each category.
Our aim in this Article is by and large to be more descriptive
than normative. While Rehnquist’s specific influence on
modern environmental law is impossible to predict with certitude, it seems clear that his efforts to curtail federal power,
promote state prerogatives, and protect private property
rights have in no small way helped to dismantle important
aspects of modern environmental law. The implications are
not particularly encouraging for those who find environmental protection to be a worthwhile endeavor. More extensive normative assessments of Rehnquist’s jurisprudential
templates, the correlation between what he wrote and how
he voted, and the jurisprudential approaches that Rehnquist
used in his constitutional and statutory interpretation in environmental cases are all subjects that warrant further study,
which we are undertaking.
II. Curtailing Federal Power
Rehnquist construed the scope of federal regulatory authority under both the Constitution and federal environmental statutes narrowly, often at the expense of environmental protection objectives. His interpretations of both
the nondelegation doctrine and the scope of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause provide examples from
the constitutional arena. Likewise, he tended to interpret
federal statutes such as the CAA, the CWA, and NEPA narrowly, except when such interpretations worked against
state interests.
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too much responsibility to federal agencies such as EPA
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA). He also aimed to curtail precipitously the extent
to which Congress may regulate activities that affect interstate commerce.
1. The Nondelegation Doctrine
The nondelegation doctrine stems from Article I of the Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States.”16 Given the reference to “All legislative Powers,”
the nondelegation doctrine addresses the extent to which
congressional grants of authority to executive agencies fall
within the ambit of Article I.
The nondelegation doctrine did not arise until the dawn of
the regulatory state. The Court determined in 1928 that a
legislative grant of authority to third parties would pass constitutional muster provided Congress coupled it with an “intelligible principle” for effectuating legislative aims.17 During the 1935 to 1936 term, the Court struck down, based on a
violation of the nondelegation doctrine, three aspects of two
signature New Deal laws. When coupled with the Court’s
limited reading of the Commerce Clause at the time, the
constitutional basis for big government seemed tenuous.
Within a few years, however, the Court experienced unprecedented turnover, affording President Franklin D. Roosevelt
the opportunity to replace four of the Court’s conservative
stalwarts with Justices less interested in using the nondelegation doctrine to limit statutory delegations. Thereafter, the
Court gave the doctrine little notice and it fell into desuetude
for the next five decades.
This changed in 1980 and 1981, when Justice Rehnquist
resurrected the doctrine to limit agency authority in two important environmental cases. In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute (the Benzene case),18 the Court was confronted with determining
whether to uphold OSHA’s establishment of limits on occupational exposure to benzene pursuant to a provision authorizing regulation at a level that would “most adequately assure[ ], to the extent feasible . . . that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity,” even
during a lifetime of exposure.19 A plurality of the Court
avoided the constitutional question of whether the provision
ran afoul of the nondelegation doctrine by narrowly interpreting the scope of authority that the statute delegated to
OSHA. The Court held that the statute required OSHA, as a
prerequisite to regulation, to make a finding that exposure to
benzene in the workplace posed a significant risk. OSHA
could promulgate a feasibility-based standard to protect employees against material impairment of health or functional
capacity due to workplace exposure only if the answer was
yes.20 Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the plurality,
concluded that, in the absence of such a threshold finding requirement, the statute would vest in OSHA a “sweeping del-

A. Constitutional Interpretation
16. U.S. Const. art. I, §1.

In certain contexts, Justice Rehnquist interpreted the Constitution as it might have been interpreted in 1935, usually in
ways adverse to modern environmental law. He strenuously
argued, for example, in favor of rescuing the nondelegation
doctrine from obscurity to keep Congress from “delegating”

17. J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 397 (1928).
18. 448 U.S. 607, 10 ELR 20489 (1980).
19. 29 U.S.C. §655(b)(5).
20. The Benzene case, 448 U.S. at 642.
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egation of legislative power” that might violate the nondelegation doctrine.21
Justice Rehnquist concurred, though he would have
found that the Act ran afoul of the nondelegation doctrine.
He concluded that Congress had skirted a hard social decision about acceptable exposure levels to hazardous chemicals in the workplace. Instead, “Congress, the governmental
body best suited and most obligated to make the choice confronting us . . . has improperly delegated that choice to the
Secretary of Labor and, derivatively, to this Court.”22 Instead of providing an “intelligible principle” to guide OSHA
in promoting statutory purposes, Rehnquist found the statute to be “completely precatory.”23 He concluded that, “especially in light of the importance of the interests at stake, I
have no doubt that the provisions at issue, standing alone,
would violate the doctrine against uncanalized delegations
of legislative power.”24
Notably, other Justices tried to convince Rehnquist to
abandon his concerns about nondelegation and instead
strike down the statute on statutory grounds. Both Justices
Thurgood Marshall (Justice Marshall) and Stevens drafted
memoranda interpreting “feasible” in such a way that would
allow the Court to invalidate OSHA’s benzene regulation on
statutory grounds.25 Rehnquist replied that neither draft
“breathes sufficient life into the word ‘feasible’ to avoid excessive delegation problems.”26 But Rehnquist’s attempts to
persuade his colleagues to adhere to his view of the nondelegation rationale did not bear fruit either.27
The following year, in American Textile Manufacturing
Institute v. Donovan (the Cotton Dust case),28 Justice William J. Brennan, writing for a 5 to 3 majority, upheld the application of OSHA’s standard for occupational exposure to
cotton dust, a health hazard formed by cotton yarn manufacturing and weaving. In adopting that standard, OSHA found
that compliance was feasible, but did not engage in costbenefit analysis to justify the level of controls it chose. The
Court held the statute did not require a cost-benefit analysis,
but instead directed OSHA to mandate that the industry conform to regulations reflecting what was “technologically
and economically achievable.”29
Rehnquist again concluded that the statute was unconstitutional: “Rather than make [a hard] choice and resolve the
difficult policy issue, however, Congress passed. . . . The
words ‘to the extent feasible’ were used to mask a fundamental policy disagreement in Congress. I have no doubt
that if Congress had been required to choose . . . , there
would have been no [legislation].”30 Rehnquist protested
the Court’s willingness to approve congressional abdication

21. Id. at 646.
22. Id. at 681-82 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).

of hard legislative choices to “nonelected officials of the Executive Branch.”31
Rehnquist’s view that Congress too readily abdicated
tough social decisions so as to run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine seems paradoxical. Indeed, in the Cotton
Dust case he urged his colleagues not to decide the case because the new Reagan Administration was assessing the feasibility of conducting a cost-benefit analysis, and a “decision by the Court at this time would be tantamount to an advisory opinion.”32 Yet, despite the change to an administration he perhaps found more favorable, Rehnquist still would
have invalidated the statute because it gave the executive
too much discretion.
The nondelegation doctrine bubbled up once again 20
years later in a CAA case, Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’ns, Inc.33 At issue was Congress’ instruction to EPA to
establish ambient air quality standards that “are requisite to
protect the public health.”34 Notwithstanding ample supposition that the case raised the prospect of a resurgence of the
doctrine,35 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a unanimous
Court, found that the provision “falls comfortably within the
scope of the discretion permitted by our precedent.”36 Justice Rehnquist did not write separately.
2. The Commerce Clause
Due in no small part to the continued vibrancy of the federalism debate, the shadow that Rehnquist’s Commerce Clause
jurisprudence casts on environmental and natural resources
law is perhaps his longest. The Constitution permits Congress to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several
states.”37 In McCulloch v. Maryland,38 Chief Justice John
Marshall (Justice John Marshall) famously held that Congress has the authority to enact the necessary and proper
means to achieve the ends to the powers enumerated in the
Commerce Clause. To hold otherwise, he reasoned, would
essentially render much of the commerce power a dead letter: “Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines . . . be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. . . . [W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we
are expounding.”39 Justice John Marshall subsequently recognized Congress’ broad authority to regulate interstate
commerce notwithstanding countervailing state laws in
Gibbons v. Ogden.40
The Court’s appetite for questioning federal power under
the Commerce Clause has ebbed and flowed in the nearly
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

23. Id. at 675 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
24. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
25. Percival, Marshall Papers, supra note 12, at 10616.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 10616 n.132 (quoting letter from Rehnquist to Justices Marshall and Stevens arguing that OSHA’s “to extent feasible” directive
was an unlawful delegation of congressional authority).
28. 452 U.S. 490, 11 ELR 20736 (1981).
29. Id. at 545-49.
30. Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 547 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Percival, Marshall Papers, supra note 12, at 10615.
531 U.S. 457, 31 ELR 20512 (2001).
Id. at 472 (citing 42 U.S.C. §7409(b)(1)).
See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Constitutional?, 98
Mich. L. Rev. 303 (1999); Jonathan Adler, American Trucking and
the Revival (?) of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 30 ELR 10233 (Apr.
2000); Craig N. Oren, Run Over by American Trucking Part I: Can
EPA Revive Its Air Quality Standards?, 29 ELR 10653 (Nov. 1999);
and Craig N. Oren, Run Over by American Trucking Part II: Can
EPA Implement Revised Air Quality Standards?, 30 ELR 10034
(Jan. 2000).
American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 476.
U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Id. at 407.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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185 years since Gibbons.41 Its tolerance of congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause reached a nadir in
the mid-1930s, when it favored a formalistic approach to
the Commerce Clause in holding that Congress may not
regulate in areas of traditional state concern, such as manufacturing, production, and other activities with only indirect effects on interstate commerce. It adopted a more
practical approach in the late 1930s, culminating in a
1942 pronouncement that Congress may regulate intrastate activities that “substantially affect” interstate commerce, which may be demonstrated by “aggregating” the
effects of those activities.42
No Justice saw fit to question congressional authority
over commerce during the next four decades.43 In the late
1960s and early 1970s the Warren E. Burger Court in particular seemed to embrace Justice John Marshall’s expansive
interpretation of broad congressional commerce authority,
harnessed only by the political process. Indeed, the Court
seemed sub silentio to have dropped the adjective “substantial” from its Commerce Clause calculus altogether.
In 1980, Justice Rehnquist began his long quest to reimpose limits on federal power under the Commerce Clause. In
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n,44 a
group of companies engaged in strip mining in Virginia
challenged Congress’ authority under the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)45 to impose environmental quality, land reclamation, and restoration requirements on “the use of private lands within the borders of
the States.”46 Writing for a unanimous Court upholding
SMCRA, Justice Marshall found Congress’ commerce
power to be “broad enough to permit . . . regulation of activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental
hazards that may have effects in more than one State.”47
Marshall’s opinion also held that Congress’ constitutional
prerogatives under the Commerce Clause are entitled to deferential rational basis review.48
Rehnquist concurred in the judgment, troubled by Justice
Marshall’s omission of the adverb “substantially” before
“affects.” Rehnquist complained that “it would be a mistake
to conclude that Congress’ power [is] unlimited,” and he
cautioned that although “one could easily get the sense from
this Court’s opinions that the federal system exists only at
the sufferance of Congress . . . there are constitutional limits.”49 Rehnquist asserted that “Congress must show that the
activity it seeks to regulate has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”50 He ultimately concluded that precedent
impelled him to support the result the majority reached, notwithstanding his view that SMCRA stretched congressional
authority “to the ‘nth degree.’”51
41. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther,
Constitutional Law 123-79 (15th ed. 2005).
42. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
43. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968).
44. 452 U.S. 264, 11 ELR 20569 (1981).
45. 30 U.S.C. §§1201-1328, ELR Stat. SMCRA §§101-908.
46. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 268.
47. Id.
48. Id. (stating that “when Congress has determined that an activity affects interstate commerce, the courts need inquire only whether the
finding is rational”) (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 272 (emphasis added) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
50. Id. at 307 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
51. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Fifteen years elapsed before Rehnquist discovered the
“nth degree” plus one. In United States v. Lopez,52 writing
for a bare majority, the now Chief Justice Rehnquist invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA) of 1990,53
in which Congress made it a federal crime “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone.”54 The Court held that Congress had exceeded its
commerce authority because the statute “neither regulates a
commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce.”55
In reaching that result, Rehnquist emphasized the need to respect traditional state powers under the Constitution and reestablished the adjective “substantial” as a necessary predicate to Congress’ commerce authority.56
Of the three categories of activities covered by the commerce power, the one best suited to support congressional
authority to enact the GFSZA was the third, activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.57 Rehnquist identified three “reference points”58 to consider in determining
whether an activity qualifies under the “substantial effects”
test. First, does Congress seek to regulate an economic activity?59 Rehnquist reasoned that the GFSZA did not do so
because it “is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing
to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise.”60 Second, does the law contain a “jurisdictional element” whereby Congress explicitly limits the legislation to
activities that affect interstate commerce?61 Perhaps elevating form over substance,62 he found the GFSZA lacking because it contained no specific language limiting its reach to
activities affecting interstate commerce.63 Last, what impact does the activity have on interstate commerce? Again,
Rehnquist found the GFSZA deficient because none was
“visible to the naked eye.”64 Especially telling to Rehnquist
was the lack of congressional findings linking gun possession and education.65 He found that “neither the statute nor
its legislative history contains express congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun
possession in a school zone.”66 Rehnquist also declined to

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

66.

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
18 U.S.C. §§921-922.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §922q(1)(A)).
Id. at 551.
Id. at 559.
The two categories that did not apply are the channels of interstate commerce and instrumentalities, persons, and things in interstate commerce.
This is how Rehnquist describes these factors in United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 561.
See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 194 (1982) (discussing “cueing” function of having Congress specify a link between the activity and commerce).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62.
Id. at 563.
For an in-depth discussion of this component, see Philip P. Frickey,
The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 695
(1996).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
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accept that aggregating the impacts of gun possession in
school zones saved the statute.67
Five years later, Rehnquist continued his effort to turn the
Commerce Clause clock back to 1935. In United States v.
Morrison,68 Rehnquist, writing again for a bare majority, invalidated the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of
1994,69 which made some gender-motivated violence an actionable federal offense. Following the path he paved in
Lopez, Rehnquist found the VAWA to be unconstitutional
because: (1) violence against women is “not, in any sense of
the phrase, economic activity,”70 and that regulating it has
“always been the province of the States”71; (2) it lacked a jurisdictional element establishing that federal enforcement
promoted Congress’ interest in regulating interstate commerce; and (3) it had effects on interstate commerce that
were too attenuated for Congress to regulate.72
Rehnquist put his post-modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence to work in an environmental case the year after
Morrison, but failed to deliver a knockout punch.73 In Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (SWANCC),74 Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, struck down aspects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ “migratory bird rule.” Rather than rule on the constitutionality of the rule, the Court found that it was an unlawful interpretation of the CWA’s definition of “navigable water” insofar as the Corps required a permit to discharge
dredge and fill material into intrastate seasonal ponds located on the site of an abandoned, isolated sand and gravel
pit that provided habitat for migratory birds.75
While the Court did not reach the constitutional question,
Rehnquist made clear that he would have struck down the
rule as inconsistent with the Commerce Clause had it instead been an act of Congress. Uncertain as to “the precise
object or activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce,” Rehnquist wrote:
[There] are significant constitutional questions raised by
[the Corps’] application of their regulations . . . . Permitting [the Corps] to claim federal jurisdiction over
ponds and mudflats falling within the “Migratory Bird
Rule” would result in a significant impingement of the
States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use. Rather than expressing a desire to readjust the
federal-state balance in this manner, Congress chose to
“recognize” [it]. We thus read the statute as written to
avoid the significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by [the Corps’] interpretation.76
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 560-61.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
18 U.S.C. §§2265-2266; 42 U.S.C. §13981.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 600.
Id. at 602.
Id.
For an interesting discussion of the disharmonies between Commerce Clause jurisprudence and environmental law, see Robert V.
Percival, “Greening” the Constitution—Harmonizing Environmental and Constitutional Values, 32 Envtl. L. 809, 836-37, 842-44,
864-65 (2002); Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC, and Gibbs, 31 ELR
10413 (Apr. 2001).
74. 531 U.S. 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001).
75. Id. at 162.
76. Id. at 174. In the aftermath of SWANCC, Congress considered
amending the CWA to make it less vulnerable to constitutional attack, by excising the definition of “navigable waters” or adding a ju-
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B. Statutory Construction
William Rehnquist almost always interpreted federal environmental legislation so as to curtail its reach. He could be
very prickly about complex federal environmental laws.77
He labeled the CAA, for example, a “harsh and draconian
statute.”78 He hindered private enforcement of environmental statutes by refusing to recognize implied private rights of
action and limiting the recovery of attorneys fees. He rarely
deferred to statutory interpretations by environmental agencies such as EPA, and he was remarkably consistent in
adopting the narrowest possible interpretations of NEPA. In
construing these statutes, Rehnquist often looked beyond
the text of the statute to its structure, legislative history, and
underlying purpose, particularly if the purpose included either placing limitations on congressional authority or promoting federalism.
1. Predisposition Against Implied Rights and Attorneys
Fees
Justice Rehnquist seemed somewhat antagonistic to citizen
participation in the enforcement of environmental legislation. This stance had the effect of hindering private efforts to
promote legislative purposes and, ultimately, curtailing legislative initiatives to protect the environment. In California
v. Sierra Club,79 the Court held that the Rivers and Harbors
Act80 does not provide an implied private right-of-action for
citizens to enforce the statute. Rehnquist concurred to emphasize the need for clear evidence of legislative intent to
create an implied right-of-action in explicit statutory text or
legislative history. He found no such evidence in that case.81
Rehnquist seemed hostile to environmental citizen suits.
He apparently ignored the plain meaning of the CAAto limit
the extent to which courts may award attorneys fees in
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club.82 The issue was whether the
CAA allows fee awards to litigants who achieve some degree of success short of earning a judicial decree on the merits, such as by “catalyzing” compliance. Writing for a 5 to 4
majority, Rehnquist held that the provision allowing a court
to make an award “whenever it determines that such award
is appropriate”83 requires that a fee claimant “attain some

77.

78.
79.
80.
81.

82.
83.

risdictional predicate that links water pollution to interstate commerce. These efforts eventually stalled. See Thomas W. Merrill, The
Story of SWANCC: Federalism and the Politics of Locally Unwanted Land Uses, in Environmental Law Stories 283, 307-09
(Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2004).
Others shared his sentiments. One of Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s
clerks wrote to Blackmun in 1991: “I don’t know what to advise you
about these petitions. The clerks all call them ‘those horrible EPA
cases.’” Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme
Court: Highlights From the Blackmun Papers, 35 ELR 10637,
10645 (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter Percival, Blackmun Papers].
Percival, Marshall Papers, supra note 12, at 10617.
451 U.S. 287, 11 ELR 20357 (1981).
33 U.S.C. §§401-418.
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 301-02 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Rehnquist was initially charged with drafting the majority
opinion. Because his opinion appeared to preclude implied causes of
action in other contexts, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall
joined what was a much narrower concurring opinion by Justice Byron R. White, converting it into the Court’s lead opinion. Percival,
Marshall Papers, supra note 12, at 10618-19.
463 U.S. 680 (1983).
42 U.S.C. §7607(f).
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success on the merits before it may receive an award of
fees.”84 Rehnquist posited that the provision allowing a fee
award whenever the court determines it to be appropriate
lacks “meaningful guidance,” despite noting that “appropriate” means “fit” or “proper.”85 Instead, he relied on a “point
of reference” not referenced in the CAA: the “American
Rule,” under which each side bears its own costs, regardless
of who prevails.86 To reach this result, Rehnquist dismissed
key passages in the legislative history, including House and
Senate reports showing that Congress did not want to limit
fee awards to “prevailing” parties.87 Instead, and without
precedent, he expressed concern about the propriety of Congress allowing fee awards to those who do not prevail on the
merits: “[T]he defendant’s reward [for prevailing] could be
a second lawyer’s bill—this one payable to those who
wrongly accused it of violating the law. We simply do not
believe Congress would have intended such a result without
clearly saying so.”88
2. Predisposition Against EPA Arguments
Rehnquist seemed to look askance at EPA’s interpretations
of pollution control legislation and was reluctant to defer to
agency expertise, especially in cases under the CAA. In
United States Steel Corp. v. EPA,89 for example, the Court
declined to grant the steel company’s writ of certiorari to review its procedural challenges to EPA’s approval of a state
implementation plan (SIP) under the CAA. Rehnquist, writing for the dissent and in opposition to EPA’s position in the
case, would have granted the petition, observing: “The fact
that the requirements of the Clean Air Act Amendments virtually swim before one’s eyes is not a rational basis, under
these circumstances, for refusing to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction.”90
Rehnquist sometimes went to great lengths to reject
EPA’s arguments. In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,91
he resorted to legislative history and structure to reject
EPA’s pro-environmental construction of the CAA. The issue was whether “work practice” procedures constituted
“emission standards” for hazardous air pollutants under
§112 of the 1970 CAA. EPA argued that the company could
not seek judicial review of an emission standard it had allegedly violated in a collateral criminal proceeding. It claimed
that the company could challenge the standard, if at all, only
in a separate civil proceeding under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).92 Rehnquist rejected EPA’s claim on the
basis of his “survey of the totality of the statutory scheme,”
concluding that Congress did not intend that EPA’s view that
the regulation was within its authority “should be conclusive in a criminal prosecution.”93 He observed that the
Act’s criminal provisions envisioned enforcement of partic84. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 693.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 683-84 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421
U.S. 240, 247, 5 ELR 20286 (1975)).
87. Id. at 687-90.
88. Id. at 692.
89. 444 U.S. 1035, 10 ELR 20081 (1980).
90. Id. at 1038-39 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
91. 434 U.S. 275, 8 ELR 20171 (1978).
92. Id. at 278-79. 5 U.S.C. §§500-596.
93. Adamo Wrecking Co., 434 U.S. at 284.
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ular limits instead of practices, and “did not empower
[EPA], after the manner of Humpty Dumpty in ‘Through the
Looking-Glass,’ to make a regulation an ‘emission standard’ by [ ] mere designation.”94 Rehnquist also based his
disagreement with EPA on his concerns about the “draconian” effect it might have on small businesses.95 Dissenting
in Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.,96 Rehnquist again rejected EPA’s reading of the CAA, employing canons of statutory construction, legislative purposes, and legislative history to do so.97
3. Predisposition Against Requiring Agencies to Consider
Adverse Environmental Consequences
Rehnquist’s opinions in cases arising under NEPA98 reflect
the same inclination to interpret the scope of federal environmental legislation narrowly.99 On the one hand, narrow
constructions of NEPA’s application enhance agency discretion to pursue projects that the agencies declare to be exempt from environmental evaluation obligations, allowing
them to avoid NEPA compliance altogether. Alternatively,
such constructions may allow agencies to pursue projects
approved after the preparation of NEPA documents that appear to be less than comprehensive, thereby minimizing
NEPA’s procedural and analytical burdens. On the other
hand, narrow constructions of NEPA reduce the power of
the federal courts to halt individual projects allegedly undertaken in violation of NEPA procedures.
To be sure, Rehnquist couched his NEPA opinions as efforts to implement congressional intent.100 The pattern of re94. Id.
95. Id. at 283 n.2. Rehnquist was more tolerant of government arguments in another case in which law and order was at stake. In United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 10 ELR 20477 (1980), writing for the
majority, Rehnquist held that the imposition of civil penalties for violations of the CWA’s oil spill provisions does not invoke the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee against self-incrimination.
96. 446 U.S. 578, 10 ELR 20353 (1980).
97. Rehnquist seems to have lost patience with the Act’s vagaries in
PPG, remarking that “[t]he effort to determine congressional intent
here might better be entrusted to a detective than to a judge.” Id. at
596 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist was reluctant to accept
EPA’s constructions of the pollution control statutes it administers
even when doing so tended to limit local discretion. In City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 24 ELR 20810
(1994), for example, the Court refused to defer to an EPA policy directive declaring that the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act’s definition of “hazardous waste” exempts ash from municipal
incinerators. Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia’s majority opinion.
98. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370d, ELR Stat. NEPA §§2-209.
99. Rehnquist minimized the scope of federal control over natural resource management in at least two other groups of cases. First, he interpreted the scope of federal common law narrowly in cases involving land title disputes, thereby leaving state law as the governing
body of law. These cases are discussed in Section III.B.1. below,
which deals with Rehnquist’s use of statutory interpretation to promote federalism. Second, he construed statutes or deed provisions to
narrow the scope of the property rights reserved by the federal government in conveyances with private parties. The effect of these
cases was to protect the property rights of the grantees, at the expense
of the federal government. See infra Section IV.B.
100. Prof. Michael Herz claims that the Rehnquist Court as a whole
tended to be more deferential to the executive than the legislative
branch throughout its administrative law jurisprudence. Michael
Herz, The Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 99 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 297, 298 (2004). Herz adds that Rehnquist himself took the position that Congress, not the courts, was the proper locus of control
over agencies. Id. at 304. See also id. at 363 (stating that “[t]he simplest and baldest conclusion is that the Rehnquist Court likes agencies more than it likes Congress”); id. (stating that the cases decided
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sults reflected in Rehnquist’s NEPA opinions, however, is
suspicious—he adopted the narrower and less protective interpretation at every single opportunity.101 Whether Rehnquist’s NEPA jurisprudence represents a net decrease in
federal power or merely a refusal to allow the courts to enhance their own authority at the expense of Congress by
adopting unintended, broad interpretations of the statute’s
scope, one thing is clear. Rehnquist’s NEPA opinions undoubtedly weakened NEPA as a mechanism for forcing development-oriented agencies or other agencies historically
inclined to minimize environmental considerations to pay
closer attention to those considerations. In contrast, as indicated below, his dissenting opinion in an important case decided under the Endangered Species Act (ESA)102 reflects a
very different view of the appropriate role of judicial discretion than the one that emerges from the NEPA cases.
Justice Rehnquist wrote opinions in five cases involving
alleged noncompliance with NEPA. In every one, he refused
to find a NEPA violation. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.103 Rehnquist’s majority opinion barred the lower federal courts
from imposing on agencies procedures more rigorous than
those derived from the APA. In particular, the Court held
that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
(D.C.) Circuit had improperly required the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to provide opportunities for public
input concerning the potential adverse environmental effects of nuclear power plant licensing beyond those required
by the APA. Concluding that “the only procedural requirements imposed by NEPA are those stated in the plain language of the Act,”104 the majority found it “clear” that
“NEPA cannot serve as the basis for a substantial revision of
the carefully constructed procedural specifications of the
APA.”105 According to Rehnquist, judicial second-guessing
of legislative and agency determinations on the appropriate
level of procedure “fundamentally misconceives the nature
of the standard for judicial review of an agency rule.”106

101.

102.
103.
104.

105.
106.

by the Rehnquist Court “show a surface respect for Congress in theory and a more meaningful respect for agencies in practice”).
Rehnquist’s NEPA opinions may illustrate his tendency to reach decisions more favorable to agencies than to the legislative body that is
the source of the agencies’ delegated power in a way that hinders environmental protection.
Rehnquist’s opinions are certainly not alone in producing this result.
The Supreme Court has never adopted an expansive interpretation
on any issue ever presented to it in a NEPA case. See Jason J.
Czarnezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the U.S. Supreme Court, Administrative Procedure, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 25 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3, 10 & n.43 (2006) (quoting David C. Shilton, Is the Supreme Court Hostile to NEPA? Some
Possible Explanations for a 12-0 Record, 20 Envtl. L. 551, 553 &
n.6 (1990)).
16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544, ELR Stat. ESA §§2-18.
435 U.S. 519, 8 ELR 20288 (1978).
Id. at 548 (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 405-06, 6 ELR
20532 (1976)). Although Rehnquist found it appropriate for agencies to subject themselves to procedures not required by the APA, he
stated that “reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if
the agencies have not chosen to grant them.” Id. at 524. See also id. at
543 (stating that “[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely
compelling circumstances ‘the administrative agencies “should be
free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue method
of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties”’”).
Id. at 548.
Id. at 547. According to Professor Herz, however, “[t]he Rehnquist
Court is dubious about judicial power generally; it is less dubious
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“[U]nwarranted judicial examination of perceived procedural shortcomings,” therefore, is bound to “seriously interfere” with congressionally prescribed process.107
Rehnquist also inveighed against excessive judicial scrutiny of the underlying policy rationale for agency decisions
with environmental implications. The D.C. Circuit had held
that the NRC had afforded inadequate consideration to energy conservation alternatives to nuclear plant construction.
The Court reversed on this point as well, emphasizing that
the role of the courts in reviewing alleged noncompliance
with NEPA is “limited both by the time at which the decision
was made and by the statute mandating review.”108 It was up
to Congress, not the courts, to resolve policy questions
about the utility and safety of nuclear energy. Congress
chose to experiment with nuclear power, and the “fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress” concerning that choice “are not subject to reexamination in the federal courts under the guise of judicial review of
agency action” in a suit alleging NEPAnoncompliance.109
Rehnquist’s opinion in Vermont Yankee set the tone for his
other NEPA opinions, all of which reject expansive interpretations of the obligations NEPA imposes on agencies to consider potential adverse consequences. In one case, Rehnquist urged the Court to make it more difficult for litigants to
challenge alleged NEPA noncompliance in federal court by
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies.110 Just as
in Vermont Yankee, Rehnquist warned against the judicial
disruption of legislative procedural choices that would
likely occur in the absence of an exhaustion requirement.111
In the other cases, Rehnquist interpreted narrowly the
range of circumstances in which NEPA applies. In a per
curiam opinion for an 8 to 1 majority in Strycker’s Bay
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen,112 Rehnquist construed the term “human environment” so as to absolve a federal agency of the need to consider less environmentally
damaging alternatives to a low-income housing project. The
opinion makes it clear that NEPA imposes solely procedural, not substantive, requirements.
Similarly, Rehnquist’s opinion for a unanimous Court in
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy113 interpreted narrowly a key statutory trigger for the

107.
108.
109.

110.
111.

112.
113.

about its own power.” Herz, supra note 100, at 364. Rehnquist also
asserted that case-by-case judicial determinations as to the appropriate degree of procedure would disrupt the statutory scheme adopted
by Congress, after balancing the interests of the relevant “opposing
social and political forces.” Id.
Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 547-48.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 557. See also Herz, supra note 100, at 304 (arguing that
Rehnquist’s opinions, including Vermont Yankee, look “to electorally accountable officials to resolve questions of value”). Herz posits
that the Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudence supports the conclusion
that “[w]hat makes a governmental decision ‘right’ is not its technical correctness or consistency with some external standard, but
rather the fact that it was the preference of duly elected and at least
somewhat accountable public officials.” Id. at 366.
General Pub. Util. Corp. v. Susquehanna Valley Alliance, 449 U.S.
1096 (1981).
Id. at 1100-01 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(asserting that allowing the plaintiff to sue despite failure to exhaust
would allow “circumvention of agency review and pursuit of NEPA
claims directly in the district courts”).
444 U.S. 223, 10 ELR 20079 (1980). According to Professor
Percival, Rehnquist was the author of the opinion. See Percival,
Marshall Papers, supra note 12, at 10611.
460 U.S. 766, 13 ELR 20515 (1983).
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responsibility to prepare environmental impact statements
(EIS). The issue was whether the NRC improperly failed to
prepare an EIS before approving resumption of operations
at the undamaged reactor at the Three Mile Island nuclear
power plant. The NRC had shut down the entire complex after a 1979 accident at another reactor at the same facility.114
Nearby residents argued that the NRC should have considered the potential damage to their psychological health and
the disruption of the stability and well-being of the community caused by restarting the undamaged reactor. In rejecting
the challenge, Rehnquist held that the NRC need not prepare
an EIS because the residents failed to allege harm to the “environment.” He asserted that NEPA only requires agencies
to consider the effects of their actions on the physical environment.115 The residents’ fears about the risk of environmental damage if the undamaged reactor were restarted
were not the proximate cause of any change in the physical
environment that directly resulted from the NRC’s decision
to allow operations to resume.116 Rehnquist found that the
political process, not NEPA, provided “the appropriate forum in which to air policy disagreements.”117
Rehnquist also allowed an agency to escape NEPA procedures in Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii.118 The
U.S. Navy prepared an environmental assessment (EA)
finding that the transfer of nuclear weapons stored on Oahu
would have no significant environmental impact. The
Navy’s regulations prohibited it from admitting or denying
that it had actually stored any weapons on Oahu because the
information was classified for national security reasons.
The environmental plaintiffs alleged that the Navy should
have prepared an EIS, rather than the more perfunctory EAit
did prepare. They claimed that the Navy had ignored the enhanced risk of a nuclear accident resulting from the proximity of the weapons storage site to three air facilities, the effects of such an accident on the population and environment,
and the effects of radiation from the storage of nuclear
weapons in a populated area.119
114. Id. at 768.
115. Id. at 772. According to Rehnquist, the legislative history showed
that “although NEPA states its goals in sweeping terms of human
health and welfare, these goals are ends that Congress has chosen to
pursue by means of protecting the physical environment.” Id. at 773.
116. According to Rehnquist, the direct effects of restarting Three Mile
Island included the release of fog caused by operation of the plant’s
cooling towers, the release of warm water into the river, and the risk
of a nuclear accident, all of which the NRC had considered. Id. at
775.
117. Id. The opinion emphasized that policy disagreements about the advisability of using potentially dangerous technologies (such as nuclear power) should be settled in the political process, not through litigation in which litigants disguise their disagreements with agency
policy choices in the garb of alleged noncompliance with statutory
procedures. Id. Cf. Herz, supra note 100, at 325 (stating that “when
other actors seek to legitimize their decisions on the basis of a supposed policy expertise rather than electoral or political accountability, the [Rehnquist] Court is often suspicious and less likely to defer”). Rehnquist also argued that a broader reading of NEPA would
be unworkable, given the limited time and resources available to
agencies subject to NEPA requirements, and would divert agencies’
attention from the core risks to the physical environment that NEPA
was designed to alleviate. Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 776. In
addition, Rehnquist feared that it would be difficult for agencies to
distinguish legitimate claims of psychological harm from spurious
claims based on policy disagreements. Id. at 777.
118. 454 U.S. 139, 12 ELR 20098 (1981).
119. Id. at 141-42.

36 ELR 10593

Writing for the majority, Rehnquist concluded that the
plaintiffs did not show that the Navy had failed to comply, or
even needed to comply, with NEPA. He found that NEPA’s
twin goals of forcing agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their actions and to disclose to the public the
results of those deliberations are not necessarily coextensive.120 There might be situations, for example, in which
NEPA would require a federal agency to consider the environmental consequences of its actions but not require it to
disclose any resulting NEPA documents. In seeking to balance NEPA’s disclosure goals with national security considerations, the appellate court had required the Navy to prepare a “hypothetical” EIS assessing the impact of nuclear
weapons storage at the facility without revealing specific information about the number and type of nuclear weapons
that might be stored there. According to Rehnquist, however, Congress had already struck the balance between environmental and national security concerns by exempting
from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) matters relating to national defense or foreign policy, including information relating to nuclear weapons.121
Thus, it was “clear” that Congress intended that the public
interest in NEPA compliance “give way to the Government’s need to preserve military secrets.”122 The Navy
therefore did not have to disclose an EIS on a proposal to
store nuclear weapons.123
C. Discussion
Rehnquist’s analysis of constitutional and statutory issues in
environmental cases evinces an interest in curtailing federal
authority in the field. In cases presenting constitutional
questions, he sought to limit federal authority through an expansive interpretation of the constraints placed on congressional power by the nondelegation doctrine and a narrow
interpretation of the degree of regulatory authority delegated by the Constitution to Congress under the Commerce
Clause. In the statutory arena, Rehnquist seemed relentlessly determined to confine the degree to which NEPA imposes obligations on federal agencies with non-environmental missions to consider and publicly disclose the potential adverse environmental impacts of their proposed actions. He also interpreted other environmental legislation,
such as the CAA, narrowly, often rejecting EPA’s interpretations of the statute in the process.
Rehnquist regarded the principle that Congress lacks the
authority to delegate legislative power to the president as “a
principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
120. Rehnquist stated that §102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C),
the provision at issue in the vast majority of NEPA cases:
serves twin aims. The first is to inject environmental considerations into the federal agency’s decisionmaking process by
requiring the agency to prepare an EIS. The second aim is to
inform the public that the agency has considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process. Through the
disclosure of an EIS, the public is made aware that the agency
has taken environmental considerations into account.
Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 143.
121. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 144-45 (citing 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1)).
122. Id. at 145-46.
123. Indeed, the Navy did not even have to prepare an EIS solely for internal purposes because the Navy’s contemplation of storing nuclear
weapons at the Oahu facility did not qualify as a proposal. Id. at 146.
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Constitution.”124 He perceived the doctrine as a means of
promoting three important functions, each one a reflection
of the first three articles of the Constitution. First, and “most
abstractly,” he characterized judicial adherence to the
nondelegation doctrine as a tool for ensuring that hard social
choices are made neither by the executive nor the judicial
branches, but by elected lawmakers: the doctrine “ensures
to the extent consistent with orderly governmental administration that important choices of social policy are made by
Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to
the popular will.”125 To the extent that Congress has difficulty reaching agreement on the details that agencies normally provide in the exercise of delegated power, it also may
have the practical effect of reducing the amount of environmental legislation that Congress is able to enact. Second,
Rehnquist asserted, the doctrine helps the president perform
his constitutional functions by providing guidance on how
to achieve congressional aims by requiring an “intelligible
principle” to guide the exercise of delegated discretion.126
Third, the doctrine provides the courts with ascertainable
standards with which to measure compliance with legislative dictates. As Rehnquist explained, “the doctrine ensures
that courts charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated
legislative discretion will be able to test that exercise against
ascertainable standards.”127
Justice Rehnquist obviously did not succeed in his quest
to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine. Indeed, when
the Court in a 2001 decision overturned a D.C. Circuit decision declaring EPA’s interpretation of a key provision of the
CAA to be a violation of the doctrine, Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia’s majority opinion.128 While possible, it seems unlikely that the nondelegation doctrine will
see much action in the near future from the Court. Thus far,
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. has exhibited little appetite
for it. It remains to be seen how much play it might receive
from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s successor, Justice
Samuel A. Alito Jr., although he is an avowed proponent of
the “unitary executive” theory. That doctrine embraces the
notion that the executive is answerable to Congress only to
the extent that the legislature makes its intentions clear. The
rejection of the doctrine by Justices Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, and Anthony M. Kennedy is based primarily on
stare decisis and not constitutional interpretation, and thus
is on shaky ground.
Rehnquist’s efforts to restrict the scope of federal regulatory authority through narrow interpretations of the scope of
the commerce power are likely to bear more immediate
fruit. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinions in both Lopez
and Morrison. Given the Supreme Court’s subsequent limitation of those precedents to cases involving regulation of
non-economic activities,129 it is not clear whether the Court
is ready to embark upon the kind of retrenchment of federal
authority that Rehnquist seemed to support. The impact of
the appointment of two new Justices since Rehnquist’s
124. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
125. Industrial Union Dep’t AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 685, 10 ELR 20489 (1980).
126. Id. at 685-86.
127. Id.
128. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 31 ELR
20512 (2001).
129. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2210-11 (2005).
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death, for example, remains to be seen. Even if the Court
does not follow Rehnquist’s impetus to narrow the scope of
Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce, it is likely
that some Justices will interpret narrowly the scope of authority delegated by Congress to administrative agencies
under the environmental statutes. Rehnquist also wrote the
majority opinion in SWANCC, in which the Court relied on
doubts concerning the constitutionality of an expansive interpretation of the CWA’s dredge and fill permit program to
invalidate the Corps’ migratory bird rule.
Despite its potential lasting import, Rehnquist’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence has some irreconcilable attributes. As a threshold matter, and despite citing Gibbons with
approval in both Lopez and Morrison,130 Rehnquist could
never quite square his philosophies with Justice John Marshall’s view that Congress may regulate intrastate activities
except for those “completely” within a state, “which do not
affect other states.”131 Moreover, Rehnquist declined to confront Marshall’s sentiment that the ultimate check on congressional overreaching under the Commerce Clause in our
representational democracy is the political process because
federal representatives are elected by the People: “The wisdom and discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at
elections are . . . the restraints on which the people must rely
solely, in all representative governments.”132 Rehnquist’s
unwillingness to trust the political process to provide adequate constraints on Congress’ exercise of its power under
the Commerce Clause contrasts with his approach toward
statutory construction, in which he often advocated for representational—and not judicial—responses to perceived
legislative shortfalls.
Rehnquist’s opinion in SWANCC appears to demonstrate
that he was above all troubled by congressional efforts to
regulate in areas traditionally left to the states. As discussed
below, his aversion to federal regulation in such situations is
consistent with his repeated dissents in the dormant Commerce Clause cases involving scarce resources traditionally
controlled by the states, including landfill space, wild minnows, and groundwater.133 Rehnquist felt strongly that
states should be able to make rational choices about how to
use their own natural resources without fear of constitutional infirmity.134
In contrast, Rehnquist did not seem as skeptical of the exercise of Congress’ authority under the Property Clause to
regulate or otherwise take actions to protect federally managed natural resources. For more than one and one-half centuries, the Supreme Court has interpreted the scope of Congress’ authority under the Property Clause to be extremely
broad, indeed to be essentially without limitation.135 In one
130. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1995); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 n.7 (2000).
131. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 74 (1824).
132. Id. at 75.
133. See infra Section III.A.2.
134. For a thoughtful rendering of this view, see Donald H. Regan, How
to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 554, 557 (1995)
(“we should ask ourselves the question, ‘Is there some reason the
federal government must be able to do this, some reason why we cannot leave the matter to the states?’”).
135. See, e.g., Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 99 (1871);
United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840). Relatively
early in Rehnquist’s tenure on the Court, the Court stated that it had
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late 19th century case, it asserted that Congress’ power under the Property Clause is “analogous to the police power of
the several States” and declared that “[a] different rule
would place the public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation.”136 Rehnquist apparently was not inclined to question such precedents.
Rehnquist’s proclivity for interpreting environmental
legislation narrowly is most starkly evident in the opinions
he wrote in cases arising under NEPA. In this respect, he was
squarely within the Court’s mainstream, as the Court has repeatedly endorsed constricted readings of NEPA’s scope.
Rehnquist’s NEPA opinions established or confirmed the
following propositions: (1) that the Act has little or no substantive component; (2) that its procedural obligations do
not repeal by implication statutes such as the APA that impose different procedures on federal agencies; (3) that other
statutes, such as FOIA, may relieve agencies of NEPA responsibilities that otherwise would have applied if they endorse the pursuit of policies inconsistent with NEPA’s consideration and disclosure policies; (4) that the “proposals”
for major federal action that trigger the EIS preparation requirement are often narrowly construed; (5) that the effects
that an agency must consider in deciding whether one of its
proposed actions requires the preparation of an EIS are confined to effects on the physical environment; (6) that litigants may not pursue NEPA claims in federal court without
first exhausting administrative remedies; and (7) that the
role of the courts in reviewing alleged noncompliance with
NEPA is a limited one and, in particular, that the courts are
not free to engraft onto the statute procedures that do not
clearly appear on its face. Cumulatively, those propositions
significantly restrict the scope of NEPA’s applicability.
Curiously, while Rehnquist repeatedly rebuked the lower
courts for their improper expansions of the CAA and NEPA
when those expansions yielded more environmental protection, in at least one case he endorsed the exercise of broad judicial discretion in a manner that detracted from rather than
amplified the force of environmental legislation. In Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) v. Hill,137 the majority held that
the TVA’s construction of the Tellico Dam violated the
ESA’s prohibition on agency actions that jeopardize the continued existence of listed species.138 It also held that the district court had no choice but to enjoin the project pending
compliance with the ESA because Congress had afforded
the courts no discretion to balance the advantages and disadvantages of injunctive relief. Rehnquist dissented, concluding that the ESA did not prohibit the district court from exercising its equitable discretion by refusing to enjoin completion of the dam.139 Further, Rehnquist concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing an injunction, in light of the TVA’s good faith and the significant public and social harm that would otherwise result.140 Rehnquist
was not convinced that Congress meant to divest the lower

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

“repeatedly observed that the power over the public lands thus entrusted to Congress is ‘without limitations.’” Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539, 6 ELR 20545 (1976) (quoting United States
v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)). Rehnquist joined Justice
Marshall’s unanimous opinion for the Court.
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897).
437 U.S. 153, 8 ELR 20513 (1978).
16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2).
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 211.
Id. at 212-13.
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courts of their discretion to deny injunctive relief despite
finding a violation of the ESA if an injunction would prejudice the public interest.141 The contrast between Rehnquist’s approval of wide judicial discretion to refuse to enjoin ESA violations and his repeated warnings in cases such
as Vermont Yankee and Metropolitan Edison about the dire
consequences of the exercise of judicial discretion in addressing alleged noncompliance with NEPA raises the possibility that an anti-environment animus lurks behind Rehnquist’s resolution of these cases.
III. Promoting Federalism
The federal-state dynamic turns on two axes—the degree to
which the Constitution constrains the exercise of both federal and state power. This part maintains that Rehnquist not
only used the federalism-related provisions of the Constitution to impose restraints on federal authority, as indicated in
the discussion in Part II above, regardless of whether the result was the protection or expansion of state power. He also
typically interpreted the federalism provisions to avoid the
imposition of restrictions on the exercise of state authority.
Together, these two approaches were designed to protect
the integrity of state sovereignty from encroachment by federal legislation.
A. Constitutional Interpretation
Rehnquist’s commitment to the promotion of federalism in
the establishment and implementation of environmental
policy is revealed in his application of the Supremacy
Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause to environmental law disputes. With one exception, he interpreted the Supremacy Clause narrowly to limit the extent to which federal environmental laws explicitly or impliedly preempt
state law. He also consistently argued that the dormant
Commerce Clause should not be read to limit state responses to national environmental challenges.
1. The Supremacy Clause
Not all environmental laws originate in the halls of Congress. State law fills in both the wide and the interstitial fissures left by federal law. Most states have myriad statutory
and common laws that apply to activities that adversely affect ecosystems, serve as a nuisance, inflict personal injury,
or diminish property value. Most states have comprehensive statutory programs that regulate activities that pollute
the air, water, and soil or regulate the use of state natural resources, such as wildlife, minerals, and forests. These common or codified laws often provide remedies for those
harmed by pollution or imprudent land use. Local laws, such
as zoning ordinances, may impose additional restrictions on
land uses that threaten to cause adverse environmental impacts. The question is how much of this law remains in the
aftermath of federal environmental law.
The Supremacy Clause provides that federal law is the
“Supreme” law of the land.142 When Congress specifically
expresses its intent to override state law, little doubt remains
that state law is preempted. Problems arise, however, when
141. Id. at 213.
142. U.S. Const. art. VI.
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Congress does not clearly state whether and the extent to
which it intends to preempt state law. Absent explicit evidence of intent to preempt, the Court has held that Congress
may preempt state law implicitly, either because federal legislation has occupied a field of interest so pervasively that
preemption is assumed or because state law conflicts with
federal law.143
Rehnquist was reluctant to find that federal environmental laws implicitly preempt state laws, especially if preemption would displace state power over matters traditionally
regulated by the states. He consistently refused to find preemption in cases arising under pollution control legislation.
In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,144 for example,
Rehnquist dissented from the majority’s holding that the
federal Noise Control Act (NCA)145 preempted a local ordinance restricting noise pollution from aircraft “overflights.”
The majority concluded the NCA so “pervades” the field of
aircraft noise that Congress has impliedly preempted local
measures even absent any express language demonstrating
an intention to do so. Rehnquist asserted that the Court
should have presumed a lack of intent to preempt matters
traditionally regulated at the local or state level, like noise
abatement, absent a “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”146 Noting the lack of express language or legislative
history demonstrating such a purpose, Rehnquist would
have deferred to the local response to noisy aircraft.147
Similarly, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. States Energy
Resources Conservation & Development Commission,148
Rehnquist voted with a unanimous Court to uphold California’s decision to impose a moratorium on siting new nuclear
power plants due to the state’s concerns about the unknown
costs of providing for the disposal of high-level radioactive
wastes. Rehnquist did not write an opinion in the case. But
Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s papers reveal that, even
though Rehnquist described himself as “not fully at rest,” he
agreed that federal law does not preempt state laws that control nuclear power development based on economic rather
than safety concerns, and he found broad federal intrusion in
the field inappropriate.149
Rehnquist also demonstrated an aversion to federal preemption of state legislation designed to control natural resources found within the state. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.150 involved the validity of two Virginia statutes
143. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resource Conservation &
Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 13 ELR 20519 (1983).
144. 411 U.S. 624, 3 ELR 20393 (1973).
145. 42 U.S.C. §§4901-4918.
146. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 643 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
147. Id. at 651.
148. 461 U.S. 190, 13 ELR 20519 (1983).
149. Rehnquist supposedly stated that the Atomic Energy Commission
read the Atomic Energy Act “to say ‘love me, love my dog.’”
Percival, Blackmun Papers, supra note 77, at 10648. Rehnquist was
also loath to interpret federal environmental laws as impliedly displacing “substantial,” though not “traditional,” state interests, particularly in cases ostensibly involving commercial speech. See, e.g.,
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 570, 11 ELR
20600 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (prohibition on billboards);
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Comm’n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 584-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (restrictions on
promotional advertising of electricity deemed inconsistent with energy conservation goals).
150. 431 U.S. 265, 7 ELR 20442 (1977).
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barring nonresidents from catching fish in the state’s territorial waters. After a business incorporated in another state
was denied a state license despite having the right to fish in
Virginia waters under a federal vessel licensing statute, it
sought a declaration that the federal laws preempted the Virginia statutes. Virginia argued that the federal Submerged
Lands Act (SLA)151 recognized a state ownership interest in
the fish swimming in their territorial waters. Because Virginia “owned” the fish, it could exclude federal licensees.
The majority held that the federal licensing statutes preempted the Virginia statutes, even though the case involved
a field traditionally occupied by the state.152 It insisted that
its decision was consistent with sound federalism policy
considerations because “[t]he business of commercial fishing must be conducted by peripatetic entrepreneurs moving,
like their quarry, without regard for state boundary lines.”153
Upholding Virginia’s laws would invite protective and retaliatory measures by other states.154
Rehnquist concurred in part and dissented in part, taking
issue with the majority’s treatment of the states’ interests in
their coastal fisheries. Although the states do not own fish
“in any conventional sense of that term, . . . it is also clear
that the States have a substantial proprietary interest sometimes described as ‘common ownership’ in the fish and
game within their boundaries.”155 Rehnquist read Supreme
Court precedents as recognizing that state interests in common resources such as fish and game “are of substantial legal moment, whether or not they rise to the level of a traditional property right.”156 As a result, only a “direct conflict”
with federal law invalidates state regulatory measures relating to fish and game, “no matter how ‘peripatetic’ the objects of regulation or however ‘Balkanized’ the resulting
pattern of commercial activity.”157 Rehnquist ultimately
agreed that the Virginia statutes were preempted, but only
because there was a direct conflict between those statutes
and the federal licensing statutes, which the SLAhad not implicitly repealed.158 He wrote separately to stress that the
majority afforded inadequate weight to the states’ interests
in controlling their own natural resources.
The following year, Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion in a second natural resources law preemption case,
California v. United States.159 The issue was whether the
adoption of the federal Reclamation Act of 1902160 prohibited a state agency from imposing conditions on the federal
government’s allocation of water impounded behind a federally constructed dam to promote aesthetic, environmental,
recreational, fish and wildlife protection, and stockwatering
uses of the water. The United States argued that it could impound whatever unappropriated water was necessary for its
reclamation project without complying with state law.161
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

43 U.S.C. §§1301-1315.
Douglas, 431 U.S. at 286.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 285-86.
Id. at 287-88.
Id. at 288.
Id.
Id. at 289.
438 U.S. 645, 8 ELR 20593 (1978).
43 U.S.C. §§371 et seq.
California, 438 U.S. at 647, 652.
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The savings clause162 whose interpretation controlled the issue appeared in §8 of the Act. It provided:
Nothing in [specified sections of the Reclamation Act]
shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to
in any way interfere with [state laws] relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in
irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and
the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such
laws, and nothing [in those sections] shall in any way affect any right of any State . . . or user of water in, to, or
from any interstate stream or the waters thereof.163

Rehnquist held that the Act did not displace the application of state water law to the distribution of federally impounded water. In doing so, he relied on the historical relationship between the federal and state governments in the
reclamation of arid lands in the West, which reflected a
“consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to
state water law by Congress.”164 In particular, Congress decided to require the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the
Interior to appropriate necessary water rights in “strict conformity with state law” and to distribute water at federal reclamation projects to landowners in accordance with that
law.165 Moreover, accommodating state water law seemed
to make sense to Rehnquist as a matter of policy. The “very
vastness” of the United States, the different times at which
federal lands were “acquired and settled, and the varying
physiographic and climatic regimes which obtain in its different parts have all but necessitated the recognition of legal
distinctions corresponding to these differences.”166 Rehnquist thus endorsed a reading of the Reclamation Act, and in
particular of its savings clause, that served to minimize federal control over resources subject to competing federal and
state claims.
In one case, Rehnquist deviated from his disinclination to
interpret federal environmental and natural resources legislation to have preemptive effects. Significantly, the result of
finding preemption was to weaken the capacity of state law
to provide levels of environmental protection beyond those
provided by federal law. In Midlantic National Bank v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,167 the majority held that Congress did not intend the “abandonment”
provisions of the federal Bankruptcy Code to preempt state
measures, such as requiring site cleanup prior to abandonment, designed to protect the public health or safety from
identified hazards. Rehnquist dissented, arguing that Congress impliedly preempted the states from regulating aban162. In the environmental and natural resources law context, a “savings
clause” typically preserves the applicability of some body of law
outside the statute that contains the clause. See, e.g., Robert L.
Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for
Pollution, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 125, 148, 161-63 (1985).
163. 43 U.S.C. §383.
164. California, 438 U.S. at 653. In another case decided the same year,
Rehnquist also relied on the need for federal deference to state water
law. The issue in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 8 ELR
20564 (1978), was whether the United States had implicitly reserved
water rights to promote aesthetic values, recreation, and fish and
wildlife protection when it created the Gila National Forest.
Rehnquist’s opinion for the majority concluded that it had not. See
infra Section III.B.1.
165. California, 438 U.S. at 665, 667.
166. Id. at 648.
167. 474 U.S. 494, 16 ELR 20278 (1986).
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donment. He seemed convinced the state acted to protect the
“public fisc,” rather than to carry out its traditional role of
protecting public health and safety.168 Perhaps that belief
explains his willingness to preempt state power despite his
other opinions protesting federal intrusions on state authority to regulate in areas of traditional state concern. Whatever
the reason for his stance, Rehnquist was unable to hold onto
the majority of the Justices who initially supported his approach. Justice Lewis F. Powell switched his vote due to
concerns that Rehnquist’s position reflected the anti-federalist proposition that the authority of a trustee in bankruptcy to abandon property “is not subject to any general requirement of compliance with state regulatory laws.”169
2. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The one area in which Rehnquist’s opinions demonstrate an
undeniable environmental sensibility is at the confluence of
states rights and environmental law under the dormant
Commerce Clause. The “dormant Commerce Clause” limits a state’s ability to regulate interstate commerce even in
the absence of congressional preemption. It finds its origin
in the Commerce Clause, which provides “Congress shall
have Power [to] regulate Commerce [among] the several
states.”170 During Rehnquist’s tenure, the Court invalidated
every attempt by states to conserve natural resources and
protect health and safety by enacting restrictions on the
transport, management, or disposal of waste. Rehnquist dissented each and every time, arguing passionately that states
should be free to enact such laws even if incidental effects
on interstate commerce ensue.
Rehnquist’s inaugural departure from most of the others
on the Court in this vein came in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey.171 New Jersey enacted a law that, with a few exceptions, prohibited the importation of all waste that originated
outside the state until it determined it could manage the
waste without endangering public health, safety, and welfare. Writing for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart held
that the law was unconstitutional, falling “squarely within
the area that the commerce clause puts off limits to state regulation.”172 Even though states have some latitude to slow
168. Id. at 516 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
169. Percival, Marshall Papers, supra note 12, at 10620. In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 11 ELR 20406 (1981), Rehnquist’s
majority opinion held the CWA’s comprehensive regulatory scheme
preempts federal common-law remedies for interstate water pollution. That decision is not particularly relevant to Rehnquist’s treatment of federalism issues, however, because the case involves preemption of one body of federal law by another body of federal law,
rather than preemption of state law by federal statute. Rehnquist did
later join an opinion, however, concluding that the CWA preempted
the common law of the state adversely affected by pollution in an interstate water pollution dispute, even though the CWA includes a
savings clause that clearly disclaims any such preemptive intent. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 17 ELR 20327
(1987). The case revolved around an interpretation of 33 U.S.C.
§1365(e), which provides that “[n]othing in [the citizen suit provision of that Act] shall restrict any right which any person (or class of
persons) may have under statute or common law to seek enforcement
of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief . . . .”
See also id. §1370. For analysis of a series of Supreme Court decisions eviscerating the CWA’s citizen suit savings clause, including
City of Milwaukee, see Glicksman, supra note 162.
170. U.S. Const. art. I, §8.
171. 437 U.S. 617, 8 ELR 20540 (1978).
172. Id. at 628.
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the flow of waste into state landfills in ways incidentally affecting interstate commerce, they cannot do so by discriminating against out-of-state wastes “unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”173 Because there was no evidence that out-of-state waste was any
more dangerous than New Jersey’s waste, the Court found
the law to be protectionist in nature, subject to “a virtually
per se rule of invalidity.”174
Rehnquist (joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger) dissented. He disagreed that the statute was protectionist, was
troubled by the detraction of sovereignty and lack of deference resulting from the majority opinion, and believed the
law fell within the Court’s quarantine cases. First, he characterized New Jersey’s ban as a legitimate effort to conserve
its natural resources and prevent serious health and safety
problems that had only incidental effects on interstate commerce.175 Acknowledging that solid waste proliferation is a
national problem, Rehnquist believed it has both local
causes and solutions and that crafting these solutions traditionally had been left to the states.176 Second, Rehnquist regarded the majority’s decision as an undue infringement on
New Jersey’s sovereignty. It was unfair to force New Jersey
to accept out-of-state waste against its will in light of the inexorable increase in health problems that would result. He
found no constitutional basis to foist upon the state the
“Hobson’s Choice” of either banning all solid waste disposal in the state or accepting waste no matter its point of origin.177 Instead, a state should be free to choose to dispose of
its own waste within while banning waste from without.178
Thus, Rehnquist maintained that states should be free to enact legislation that discriminates—even facially—against
out-of-state articles of commerce if the legislature’s aim is
to protect its citizens’ health and safety.179 Third, Rehnquist
was troubled by the Court’s dismissive attitude toward the
state’s legislative determinations as well as to the findings of
the state’s highest court upholding the legislature’s justification for the ban.180 Finally, Rehnquist likened New Jersey’s
ban on out-of-state waste to state quarantine laws that the
Court had upheld since the dawn of the industrial revolution,181 and he challenged the notion that the Court’s quaran173.
174.
175.
176.

177.
178.

179.
180.
181.

Id. at 627.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 630 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist remarked: “Congress specifically recognized the
substantial dangers to the environment and public health that are
posed by current methods of disposing of solid waste in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.” Id. at 631 n.2 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 632 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that “New Jersey
should be free . . . to prohibit the importation of solid waste because
of the health and safety problems that such waste poses to its citizens,” and that the state’s continuing need to dispose of its own waste
“does not mean that New Jersey may not prohibit the importation of
even more solid waste into the State”).
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 633 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Rehnquist found no basis to distinguish solid waste from “germ-infected rags, diseased meat, and other noxious items” that the Court
had previously allowed the states to block at their borders. Id. at
631-32. In particular, he observed that leachate, methane gas, and
vectors from landfills present hazards not unlike those the Court
had traditionally allowed states to prohibit under the quarantine exception to the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 630 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
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tine cases turned on the hazard associated with the article’s
transport rather than its destination.182
The next year in Hughes v. Oklahoma183 the majority invalidated an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the transport
of minnows caught in the state for sale outside the state because it was improperly discriminatory and therefore violated the dormant Commerce Clause.184 Rehnquist would
have upheld the state law as a permissible, evenhanded effort to effectuate a legitimate state interest (the preservation
of indigenous fish populations) with only incidental effects
on interstate commerce.185 In his view, the Court had previously upheld many regulations designed to conserve and
maintain the natural resources of a state, and he would have
continued to accord to the states wide latitude to fashion regulations appropriate for the protection of wildlife, absent a
direct conflict with federal law.186 Further, Rehnquist concluded that Oklahoma’s chosen method for achieving its legitimate interest in conserving wild minnows at worst burdened interstate commerce only minimally.187
Three years later, Rehnquist dissented again in Sporhase
v. Nebraska.188 The majority held that a Nebraska statute
that restricted the withdrawal of groundwater from any well
in the state for use in an adjoining state violated the dormant
Commerce Clause. Rehnquist argued that Nebraska had the
constitutional prerogative to preserve dwindling groundwater supplies by requiring those who wished to transport it out
of state to obtain a permit.189 He would have upheld Nebraska’s law for two reasons. First, “[a]s with almost all of
the Western States, Nebraska does not recognize an absolute
ownership interest in groundwater, [but] only a right to use
[it] on the land from which it has been extracted.”190 Therefore, he reasoned, the groundwater was not an “article of
commerce” for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Second, he believed the dormant Commerce Clause does
not upset a state’s legitimate, traditional efforts to devise rational means to regulate “essential” resources like water
use, particularly in the West.191
182. According to Rehnquist, solid waste that presents a health hazard
when it reaches its destination may also present hazards in transit. He
failed to see “why a State may ban the importation of items whose movement risks contagion, but cannot ban the importation of items which,
although they may be transported into the State without undue hazard, will then simply pile up in an ever increasing danger to the public’s health and safety.” Id. at 632-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
183. 441 U.S. 322, 9 ELR 20360 (1979).
184. Id. at 335. In doing so, the Court overruled Geer v. Connecticut, 161
U.S. 519 (1896). The statute invalidated by the Court effectively allowed commerce involving only minnows raised in fish hatcheries
but prohibited the seining of wild ones from state rivers and streams.
185. Id. at 343 n.7 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (applying the balancing approach from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)).
186. Id. at 342-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 343-44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). According to Rehnquist, the
Oklahoma statute served “the special interest of the State . . . in preserving and regulating exploitation of free-swimming minnows found
within its waters. . . . [T]he range of regulations that a State may
adopt under these circumstances is extremely broad. . . .” Id. at 335.
188. 458 U.S. 941, 12 ELR 20749 (1982).
189. Id. at 961 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 964 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
191. Id. One other natural resources case bears mentioning. Largely due
to the wide latitude states have over the use of their natural resources,
Rehnquist, joined by O’Connor, rejected as “artificial and unconvincing” the “market participant” exception to the dormant Commerce Clause that a plurality of the Court found availing in 1984 in
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,
14 ELR 20548 (1984).
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Rehnquist returned to these themes in two more dissents
written a decade later. In Chemical Waste Management, Inc.
v. Hunt,192 the Court struck down on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds a surcharge imposed by Alabama on outof-state waste haulers. The Court rejected the state’s contention that the fee was valid because it served legitimate purposes, including protection of health and safety and conservation of natural resources.193 It found that the state did not
choose the least burdensome means of achieving these legitimate ends. In his lone dissent, Rehnquist chided his brethren for failing to “acknowledge that a safe and attractive environment is the commodity really at issue in cases such as
this.”194 According to him, the “[s]tates may take actions legitimately directed at the preservation of the State’s natural
resources, even if those actions incidentally work to disadvantage some out-of-state waste generators.”195 In addition,
he argued that the Court’s ruling would have a “perverse
regulatory incentive” for states to ban in-state hazardous
waste disposal categorically.196
In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources,197 the Court overturned a
Michigan law that prohibited disposal of in-state or out-ofstate waste in county landfills unless the landfill operator
complied with a state-approved disposal plan. Rehnquist
would have upheld the statute as one aimed to protect legitimate environmental and health interests. He regarded
the majority’s opinion as an unfair attack on state sovereignty, arguing that the Commerce Clause does not require
“cheap-land States to become the waste repositories for
their brethren, thereby suffering the many risks that such
sites present.”198 The majority’s decision had the paradoxical consequence of punishing common sense state solutions
to important national problems and would likely encourage
states to take a “wait and see approach” by sending their
wastes to disposal sites located in other states.199 Rehnquist
doubted that Michigan’s “comprehensive approach to regulating in this difficult field, is the stuff of which economic
protectionism is made.”200
Finally, in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of
Environmental Quality,201 the Court rejected a law that imposed a higher fee for out-of-state than in-state waste disposal. Again in dissent, Rehnquist would have upheld the
law as a rational state response to a national environmental
problem.202 Expressing his frustration, he bemoaned the
Court’s “stubborn” refusal “to acknowledge that a clean and
healthy environment, unthreatened by the improper dis192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

504 U.S. 334, 22 ELR 20909 (1992).
Id. at 343.
Id. at 350 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 349 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
504 U.S. 353, 22 ELR 20904 (1992).
Id. at 373 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 369 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also id. at 368 (charging
that “the substantial risks attendant to waste sites make them extraordinarily unattractive neighbors,” that few states are willing to help
dispose of waste, and that “[t]hose locales that do provide disposal
capacity to serve foreign waste effectively are affording reduced environmental and safety risks to the States that will not take charge of
their own waste”).
200. Id. at 369-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
201. 511 U.S. 93, 24 ELR 20674 (1994).
202. Id. at 109-10 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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posal of solid waste, is the commodity really at issue in cases
such as these.”203
B. Statutory Construction
Justice Rehnquist sought to protect state prerogatives
through statutory interpretation as well as constitutional adjudication. Sometimes he overrode agency interpretations
of the environmental statutes that, in his view, threatened to
encroach upon state interests. In other cases, he deferred to
agency interpretations that protected state prerogatives. In
particular, Rehnquist wrote a series of opinions in which he
endorsed statutory interpretations that enhanced state natural resource management capabilities. He generally supported the allocation of primary decisionmaking authority
over the management and use of natural resources such as
water and land to the states. In particular, he consistently interpreted federal natural resource management legislation
and the federal implied reserved water rights doctrine narrowly to protect state primacy in the management of water
resources, and he applied the equal footing and related doctrines to enhance either state ownership or control over land
and other natural resources.
1. Protection of State Prerogatives Through Statutory
Interpretation
Perhaps the best example in an environmental case of Rehnquist’s willingness to take issue with agency statutory interpretations that posed threats to federalism was his majority
opinion in SWANCC.204 SWANCC involved a challenge to
the Corps’ application of its migratory bird rule under the
CWA’s dredge and fill permit program. Relying on the rule,
the Corps required a consortium of local governments to apply for a permit before building a landfill on an abandoned
sand and gravel mining site containing isolated, intrastate,
and seasonal ponds that provided habitat for migratory
birds.205 The consortium challenged the Corps’ assertion of
jurisdiction as exceeding the bounds of both the CWA and
the Commerce Clause.206
The case turned on the meaning of the term “navigable
waters” under the CWA. The Act defines that term for purposes of both the dredge and fill and national pollutant discharge elimination system permit programs to “mean the
waters of the United States.”207 Although the Act does not
define the latter term, the Conference Report on the 1972
version of the statute indicated that the conferees “intend
that the term ‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation.”208 In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,209 the Court, in an opinion
joined by Justice Rehnquist, had previously upheld the
Corps’ interpretation of the term “navigable waters” to include non-navigable wetlands that are adjacent to otherwise
navigable waters. The next year, the Corps clarified its posi203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 110 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
531 U.S. 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001).
Id. at 162.
For a discussion of the constitutional dimensions of this case, see supra Section II.A.2.
207. 33 U.S.C. §1362(7).
208. S. Rep. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972).
209. 474 U.S. 121, 16 ELR 20086 (1985).
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tion on the scope of the permit program by issuing the migratory bird rule. It asserted that navigable waters include
“isolated intrastate waters” that are or could be used as habitat by migratory birds that cross state lines.210
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in
SWANCC, found that the Corps’ interpretation of “navigable waters” in the migratory bird rule exceeded the bounds
of the CWA.211 He concluded that the Corps’ application of
the dredge and fill permit program to the proposed landfill
site raised “significant constitutional questions,” particularly because allowing the Corps to regulate the consortium’s property under the rule “would result in a significant
impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power
over land and water use.”212 Finding “nothing approaching a
clear statement from Congress that it intended §404(a) to
reach an abandoned sand and gravel pit such as we have
here,” Rehnquist interpreted the term “navigable waters” to
exclude the intrastate waters involved as a means of avoiding “the significant constitutional and federalism questions”
that a contrary conclusion would have presented.213
On the other hand, Rehnquist was willing to defer to EPA
interpretations of environmental statutes when they reduced
regulatory burdens on the states and promoted federalism.
In Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,214 for example, Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that the 1970
version of the CAA required EPA to approve the authority of
the states to issue variances from emission limitations under
the CAA as permissible “revisions” to SIPs. Accepting
EPA’s reading of the statute, Rehnquist relied on the legislative history, including “legislative documents” and statements made (or not made) during floor debates.215 Train illustrates Rehnquist’s willingness to rely on multi-faceted
techniques for statutory interpretation if the result of doing
was to protect or enhance state authority. In Environmental
Protection Agency v. Brown,216 EPA convinced Rehnquist,
writing per curiam for the Court, that the Court need not
reach the merits of a pending challenge to a James (Jimmy)
E. Carter Administration EPArule that required state regulation of mobile source air pollution under the CAA when the
Reagan Administration subsequently withdrew the rule.217
Rehnquist employed a variety of interpretive techniques
to support subordination of federal to state decisionmaking
authority over water allocation and use. One of them was to
interpret narrowly the scope of the federal implied reserved
water rights doctrine. The issue in United States v. New Mexico218 was how much river water the United States reserved
when it created the Gila National Forest in 1899. Rehnquist
concluded that, in enacting the Forest Service Organic Act
of 1897,219 Congress meant to reserve national forests for
only two purposes—to conserve water flows and to furnish
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

216.
217.
218.
219.

51 Fed. Reg. 41217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 162, 31 ELR 20382 (2001).
Id. at 174.
Id.
421 U.S. 60, 5 ELR 20264 (1975).
Id. at 84. Rehnquist rejected the Natural Resources Defense Council’s interpretation of the Conference Committee’s work as having
“no specific support in legislative documents or debates.” Id. at 96.
431 U.S. 99, 7 ELR 20375 (1977).
See Percival, Marshall Papers, supra note 12, at 10614.
438 U.S. 696, 8 ELR 20564 (1978).
16 U.S.C. §476 (repealed 1976).
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a continuous supply of timber.220 Writing for a 5 to 4 majority, he rejected the government’s contention that Congress
intended to set aside sufficient water to serve aesthetic, environmental, recreational, or wildlife preservation purposes.221 He noted that “[w]here Congress has expressly addressed the question of whether federal entities must abide
by state water law, it has almost invariably deferred to the
state law.”222 The United States invoked the federal reserved
water rights doctrine to support its claim for water rights, but
Rehnquist characterized it as “a doctrine built on implication” that represents “an exception to Congress’ explicit
deference to state laws in other areas.”223 Interpreting the
exception narrowly, Rehnquist concluded that Congress
intended to subordinate the Forest Service’s attempts to
use water for the purposes in question to state water law
and policy.
The question of whether federal or state law controls natural resource ownership, use, or management arose in another group of cases. One recurring issue was whether federal common law governed particular natural resource management issues and, if so, whether it displaced state law. In
each case, Rehnquist’s opinions took a relatively narrow
view of the circumstances in which the application of federal common law is appropriate, reflecting his marked preference for resorting to state law to govern resource management questions. Some of these cases involved, either in conjunction with federal common-law issues or separately, the
application of the equal footing doctrine. That doctrine governs, among other things, the scope of the title to lands underlying navigable waters that the states acquired upon their
admission to the Union. Rehnquist typically favored applications of the doctrine that maximized the states’ proprietary or regulatory control over the lands, water, or other
natural resources involved.
The first case in which Rehnquist addressed the propriety
of applying federal common law was United States v. Little
Lake Misere Co.224 The United States brought an action to
quiet title to land in Louisiana which it had acquired under
the Migratory Bird Conservation Act (MBCA)225 as part of
a wildlife refuge. The documents transferring title to the
United States reserved to Little Lake Misere (LLM) various
minerals for 10 years and for as long thereafter as LLM’s
drilling operations continued. After that, the mineral rights
were to vest in the federal government. After the initial 10year period expired without any drilling activity, the United
States issued oil and gas leases on the parcels. LLM claimed
the mineral rights, relying on a Louisiana statute that purported to make it impossible for the United States to acquire
by prescription any mineral rights reserved to previous own220. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707-08.
221. He supported his conclusion that Congress intended to establish the
national forests in general, and this one in particular, for the two
“narrow purposes” he identified by noting that Congress had used
“broader language” in authorizing the establishment of the national
parks. In addition, he argued that when Congress intended to maintain minimum instream flows for particular national forests, it had
done so in the legislation establishing those forests. That kind of provision was missing from the statute creating the Gila National Forest. Id. at 709-10.
222. Id. at 701.
223. Id. at 715.
224. 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
225. 16 U.S.C. §§715 et seq.
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ers. According to LLM, the state statute rendered inoperative the conditions for extinguishment of the reservations.226
The majority held that the Louisiana statute did not preclude termination of the reservations, emphasizing that the
land acquisitions arose from and bore heavily upon a federal
regulatory program. It concluded that federal, not state law,
applies to transactions undertaken by the federal government, even if the federal statute authorizing the transactions
(here, the MBCA) does not explicitly so provide. Under
choice of law principles adopted by the federal courts, the
Louisiana statutes did not apply to the mineral reservations
so that LLM’s interests expired in accordance with the terms
of the reservations.227 Justice Rehnquist concurred in the
judgment, minimizing the importance of the federal interest
in controlling the fate of the minerals in question. He regarded “the central question” as whether Louisiana had the
constitutional authority to apply its anti-prescription statute
to the relevant transactions, “and not whether a judicially
created rule of decision, labeled federal common law,
should displace state law. The [MBCA] does not establish a
federal rule controlling the rights of the United States under
the reservation.”228 Rehnquist found the federal government’s interest in applying a uniform federal rule to govern
real property transactions to which it is a party to be “too tenuous” to justify the invocation of federal common law, particularly given the Court’s past insistence that state law governs real property transactions.229
Another case involving the potential application of federal common law was Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v.
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.230 Oregon sued a sand and
gravel company in ejectment to settle ownership of lands
underlying the Willamette River, a navigable river that is not
an interstate boundary. The state argued that, because of its
sovereignty, it owned in fee simple the disputed portions of
the riverbed.231 Four years previously, the Court had held in
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona232 that federal common law determines whether a state retains title to lands that reemerge
from the bed of a navigable stream because that land is subject to the equal footing doctrine. That doctrine, which dates
back to the Supreme Court’s decision in Pollard’s Lessee v.
Hagan,233 provides that when states are admitted to the
Union, they acquire the same jurisdiction over lands
within their borders as the original 13 states. Pollard’s
Lessee established that, pursuant to this doctrine, new
states acquire title to the lands underlying navigable waters
within their boundaries.234
226.
227.
228.
229.

230.
231.
232.
233.

234.

Little Lake Misere Co., 412 U.S. at 583-84.
Id. at 592-94, 604.
Id. at 606-07 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 607. Rehnquist nevertheless concurred in the judgment because the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities prohibits a state
from discriminating against the United States in a manner that interferes with the execution of federal laws. The Louisiana statute discriminated by precluding the acquisition of title to minerals by prescription by the United States, but not by nongovernmental grantees.
Id. at 608.
429 U.S. 363, 7 ELR 20137 (1977).
Id. at 365.
414 U.S. 313, 4 ELR 20094 (1973).
3 How. 212 (1845). For further discussion of the equal footing doctrine, see 1 George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman,
Public Natural Resources Law §3:11 (1991).
Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 429 U.S. at 369-70.
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In his opinion for the majority in Corvallis, Justice
Rehnquist declared that the decision in Bonelli to apply federal common law had been incorrect. The Court had erred
by failing to recognize that, while the determination of the
initial boundary between a riverbed acquired by a state under the equal footing doctrine and riparian fast lands is governed by federal law, once that determination has been
made, “the role of the equal footing doctrine is ended” and
the land becomes subject exclusively to state law.235 The
Court had consistently held that, unless some other principle
of federal law requires a different result, state law governs
issues relating to the ownership of riparian lands. Rehnquist
added, “under our federal system, property ownership is not
governed by a general federal law, but rather by the laws of
the several States.”236 Accordingly, the states are free to formulate and modify rules of riparian ownership as they see
fit.237 Because Bonelli had wrongly treated the equal footing
doctrine as a source of federal common law in inappropriate
circumstances, and there was no other basis for allowing
federal common law to override state real property law, the
ownership of the disputed riverbed lands in Corvallis was
governed by state law, not federal common law.238
Rehnquist also addressed the relationship between the
equal footing doctrine and the role of federal common law in
his 1982 opinion in California v. United States.239 The
United States and California both claimed ownership of
oceanfront land on the coast of California created through
accretion. The result in the case depended on whether federal or state law applied. Under California law, the state
would own the land, but under federal law, title to the deposited land vested in the United States as the accretions
formed. The majority held that federal law governs disputes
over accretions to oceanfront land where title rests with or
was derived from the federal government and that, under
federal law, the United States owned the land in dispute.240
Rehnquist concurred in the judgment. He interpreted the
SLA as withholding from grants to the states all accretions
to coastal lands acquired or reserved by the United States.
But he objected to the majority’s reliance on a previous case
that had endorsed the application of federal common law to
a dispute over title to oceanfront property between a state
and a federal patent holder. Although he suggested that the
Court did not need to address the continuing vitality of that
precedent,241 he seemed prepared to reverse the ruling that
federal law governs ownership disputes like the one involved there in the absence of a governing federal statute.
In yet another case involving the equal footing doctrine,
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Court’s ruling in
favor of the United States in a quiet title action pitting the
federal government against the state of Idaho.242 The dis235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 376-77.
Id.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 381.
457 U.S. 273 (1982). This is a different case from the case of the
same name, discussed above, that involved an interpretation of the
extent to which the Reclamation Act of 1902 displaced state law in
the allocation and use of water impounded behind a federally constructed dam. For discussion of that case, see supra notes 159-66 and
accompanying text.
240. California, 457 U.S. at 278.
241. Id. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
242. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 31 ELR 20725 (2001).
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pute involved conflicting claims to submerged lands underlying two rivers. The majority held that the United States
owned those lands in trust for the Coeur d’Alene tribe, finding that Congress intended to bar passage of title to those
lands to the state upon its admission to the Union.243 Rehnquist, joined by three other Justices, argued that, even if the
federal government intended at the time of Idaho’s admission to retain title in trust to the disputed submerged lands,
that intent was insufficient to defeat Idaho’s title to submerged lands within its borders. According to Rehnquist,
ownership of lands under navigable waters is an incident of
sovereignty, such that there is a presumption against defeat
of a state’s title to those lands.244 The majority mistakenly
applied the equal footing doctrine to overcome that presumption. Among other things, it made the unwarranted assumption that any use granted by the United States with respect to navigable waters must necessarily include a reservation of title to the submerged lands below them.245 Rehnquist concluded that the evidence of congressional intent to
retain title to the submerged lands was not even close to being sufficient to rule in favor of the state; “Congress’s desire
to divest an entering State of its sovereign interest in submerged lands must be ‘definitely declared or otherwise
made very plain.’”246
In a final case involving the application of the equal footing doctrine, Rehnquist again dissented from a decision he
perceived to be insufficiently protective of state interests.
The majority in Minnesota v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa
Indians247 held that tribal usufructuary rights to hunt and
fish survived Minnesota’s admission to the Union. Rehnquist contested the majority’s premise that the tribal rights
recognized by the majority are not inconsistent with state
sovereignty. He characterized treaty rights like those allowing the Chippewas to hunt and fish as “temporary and
precarious” and concluded that, under the equal footing
doctrine, they did not survive the state’s admission to
the Union.248
C. Discussion
Justice Rehnquist’s constitutional analysis in environmental
cases promoted states rights. He tended in cases involving
the Supremacy Clause to rule that federal environmental
and natural resource management statutes did not preempt
state law. In every one of the cases in which the Court held
that state environmental legislation violated the dormant
Commerce Clause, Rehnquist dissented, protesting that the
states had the right to protect their own natural resources.
Just what was it about state laws governing use of a state’s
natural resources and management of its environment that
captured Rehnquist’s attention in cases attacking those laws
based on alleged violations of the Supremacy and dormant
Commerce Clauses? Rehnquist’s opinions in these cases
largely promote a singular ideal: the need to protect a state’s
authority, in an area that has traditionally been regarded a
243. Id. at 280-81.
244. Id. at 281-82 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 282-87 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 288 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
247. 526 U.S. 172, 29 ELR 20557 (1999).
248. Id. at 219-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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matter of local concern, to control the fate of its own natural
resources. In the preemption cases, Rehnquist repeatedly
stressed the strength of the states’ interests in natural resource management and the tradition of federal deference to
those interests. He characterized “the crucial inquiry” in
dormant Commerce Clause cases as “determining whether
[the challenged state or local law] is basically a protectionist
measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed
to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate
commerce that are only incidental.”249 In his view, natural
resources are a commodity traditionally subject to state control, and federal courts should presume that state conservation laws are rational means to achieve legitimate state ends
that have but incidental effects upon interstate commerce.
Moreover, Rehnquist took the position that the federal
courts should defer to both state legislative and judicial findings supportive of a non-protectionist impetus behind state
waste control laws.250
Although Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in one
important preemption case (the 1978 California case), the
pursuit of his agenda in the dormant Commerce Clause
cases was for the most part a Quixotic endeavor. While he
had occasional allies, including Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices Blackmun, O’Connor, and David H. Souter, Rehnquist was often a lone dissenter in these cases. He never enticed more than a single Justice at a time to accept his reading of the dormant Commerce Clause. Curiously, while Rehnquist joined Justices Scalia and Thomas, and sometimes
Kennedy and O’Connor, in restricting federal power and expanding state sovereignty under the 10th and 11th Amendments, none of these four other than O’Connor saw fit to join
Rehnquist in his advocacy of state efforts to protect natural
resources from being damaged by undue or unwanted outof-state waste.251 Rehnquist’s inability to overcome the isolation in which he found himself in the dormant Commerce
Clause cases undoubtedly frustrated him. He vented this
frustration in a slightly different, but related context:
The wisdom of a messianic insistence on a grim sink-orswim policy of laissez-faire economics would be debatable had Congress chosen to enact it; but Congress has
done nothing of the kind. It is the Court which has imposed the policy under the dormant Commerce Clause, a
policy which bodes ill for the values of federalism which
have long animated our constitutional jurisprudence.252

Rehnquist thus most likely would have agreed with Prof.
Robert Percival’s observations about the tensions between
the various strands of the Court’s disposition of federalism
issues in environmental cases decided during Rehnquist’s
tenure as Chief Justice:
[T]he Court’s current dormant commerce clause jurisprudence is undeniably in tension with the Court’s efforts to vindicate the dignity and sovereignty of states. A
Court that once extolled the importance of upholding
states’ sovereign interests in protecting their citizens
against unwanted exposure to risks originating in other
249. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep’t of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 368, 22 ELR 20904 (1992).
250. Rehnquist’s takings jurisprudence was not similarly deferential to
state legislative and judicial determinations. See infra Part IV.
251. See generally Percival, supra note 73, at 846-47.
252. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 217 (1994)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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states now routinely invalidates their regulatory initiatives that seek to do so.253

Thus far Rehnquist’s approach to the dormant Commerce
Clause has managed to attract more support from academics
than others on the Court.254 That may yet change. Justices
Scalia and Thomas have denied there is any basis to the dormant Commerce Clause as an original matter, and have
agreed to invalidate state laws under this doctrine as a matter
of stare decisis, and even then only with respect to discriminatory state action not needed to achieve a legitimate state
purpose.255 With the appointment of Rehnquist’s successor,
Chief Justice Roberts, in 2005 and Justice Alito in 2006,
there may be new opportunities for the Court to apply the
dormant Commerce Clause in a manner more consistent
with Rehnquist’s vision of federalism.
Rehnquist’s commitment to the protection of state sovereignty over matters of traditional state and local concern
also provided the underpinning for much of his analysis in
statutory interpretation cases arising under the federal environmental laws. This commitment appears to have induced
him to downplay if not ignore evidence of congressional intent to vest in federal agencies a degree of environmental
regulatory authority with which Rehnquist seemed uncomfortable. In SWANCC, for example, he gave short shrift to a
canon of statutory interpretation256 that provides that if Congress has amended a statute in a manner that does not upset
an extant agency construction, acquiescence is assumed.
Even though Congress amended the CWA after the issuance
of the Corps’ 1977 rule defining “navigable waters” to include more than traditionally navigable waters, and again in
1987 after issuance of the migratory bird rule, Rehnquist declined to find congressional acquiescence in either definition.257 In the same case, he also downplayed the significance of relevant (and arguably determinative) legislative
history, rejecting all aspects of the CWA’s legislative history
that support a broad construction of the term “navigable water” to include isolated waters visited by migratory birds.258
Finally, Rehnquist rejected what even he agreed was a
“plausible” construction of the statute advanced by the
253. Percival, supra note 73, at 865.
254. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995
Sup. Ct. Rev. 217 (arguing that dormant Commerce Clause cases
allow states to discriminate in favor of insiders, mishandle economic
analysis, and unnecessarily protect outsiders who can avail themselves of the in-state political process).
255. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S.
888, 898 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the only time
dormant Commerce Clause issues should arise is when a state law
accords “discriminatory treatment to interstate commerce in a respect not required to achieve a lawful state purpose”).
256. In some cases, judges conclude that neither the plain meaning of the
statutory text nor the statute’s legislative history is capable of furnishing a sufficient guide to the intended meaning of a statute. In
such cases, judges may invoke “canons of construction” as supplemental aids in discerning the legislature’s intent. See William N.
Eskridge Jr. et al., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation 330 (2000) (stating that substantive canons of construction
“significantly affect statutory interpretation in federal and state
courts”). The role of these canons in statutory interpretation is controversial, particularly when the canons “are rooted in broader policy
or value judgments.” Id.
257. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 169, 31 ELR 20382 (2001).
258. Rehnquist discounted a Conference Report statement indicating that
Congress intended that “‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest
possible constitutional interpretation,” arguing that it did not
“signif[y] that Congress intended to exert anything more than its
commerce power over navigation.” Id. at 168 n.3.
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Corps. While the terms “navigable waters” and “waters of
the United States” leave room for interpretation, SWANCC
departs from Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.’s259 instruction that courts defer to reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms proffered by expert agencies charged with administering the
statute containing the ambiguous provision. Instead of deferring to the Corps’ (and EPA’s) most recent definition of
the term “navigable waters,” Rehnquist relied on the Corps’
“initial” 1974 definition—which was probably vestigial to
the Corps’ historical mission of safeguarding navigational
and recreational uses of interstate waters and which the
Corps had abandoned nearly 25 years earlier.
The obvious explanation for Justice Rehnquist’s interpretive awkwardness in SWANCC is his desire to promote federalism. He relied prominently on the CWA’s policy of preserving and protecting “the primary responsibilities and
rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution,
[and] to plan the development and use . . . of land and water
resources . . . .”260 According to Rehnquist, allowing the
Corps to exercise jurisdiction over the abandoned sand and
gravel pit in SWANCC based merely on the presence of migratory birds “would result in a significant impingement of
the States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use.”261 The desire to avoid addressing the “significant”
federalism questions that the Corps’ interpretation presented provided Rehnquist with a justification for refusing
to apply Chevron deference.262
Rehnquist’s commitment to the protection of state sovereignty in areas of traditional state regulation is also reflected
in every single implied reserved water rights, federal common law, and equal footing doctrine case that arose under
the federal natural resource management laws. In New Mexico, Rehnquist’s narrow interpretation of the implied reserved water rights doctrine left the federal government’s
ability to devote water in the national forests to environmental protection purposes more or less at the mercy of state water law. In Little Lake Misere, Rehnquist disagreed with the
majority’s endorsement of federal common law as a means
of displacing the application of state law to real property
transactions. In Corvallis, he objected to the use of federal
common law to determine conflicting state and private
claims of title to riparian lands. According to Rehnquist,
state law governs the effect on title to riparian lands of
259. 467 U.S. 837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984).
260. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167 (quoting 33 U.S.C. §1251(b)).
Rehnquist’s expansive reading of §1251(b) to reduce the scope of
federal regulation provides a curious contrast to his treatment of the
CWA’s savings clauses in cases concerning the effect of the CWA’s
enactment on supplemental federal and state common-law remedies.
Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 11 ELR 20406 (1981), holding that the savings
clause of the CWA’s citizen suit provision (33 U.S.C. §1365(e)) did
not preserve federal common-law nuisance remedies for interstate
water pollution. See supra note 169. He joined the majority opinions
in Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 11 ELR 20684 (1981), in which the Court reached
the same result as in City of Milwaukee with respect to ocean pollution, and in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 17
ELR 20327 (1987), in which the Court held that §1365(e) did not
preserve state common-law remedies available under the law of the
downstream state.
261. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174 (quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) (stating that “regulation of land
use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments”)).
262. Id. at 172-73.
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events that occur after a state’s admission to the Union,
given the long-standing recognition that property ownership generally is governed by state law rather than by a general federal law. In the 1982 California case, Rehnquist disavowed the majority’s apparent willingness to apply federal
common law in a broader range of cases than he deemed appropriate. In the Idaho v. United States263 case, Rehnquist
again protested the majority’s inappropriately expansive
application of the equal footing doctrine in a dispute over title to inland submerged lands. Rehnquist charged that the
majority improperly divested the state’s interest in submerged lands, despite the absence of clear evidence that
Congress intended that result. In Mille Lac, on the other
hand, Rehnquist protested the majority’s conclusion that Indian treaty and fishing rights survived Minnesota’s admission to the Union. Favoring the application of the equal footing doctrine this time, Rehnquist argued that the doctrine
had the effect of abolishing the tribe’s usufructuary rights
when the state was admitted to the Union.
Rehnquist sometimes supported the application of federal law and sometimes supported the application of state
law in these cases. He sometimes objected to, but sometimes
concurred in, the application of the equal footing doctrine.
But he always either favored application of the body of law
that was more protective of state interests, or objected to the
application of federal law in a particular case in a manner
that he regarded as insufficiently protective of state sovereignty or state proprietary interests.
IV. Protecting Private Property
One of the hallmarks of the Rehnquist Court has been its
commitment to the protection of private property rights.264
Chief Justice Rehnquist himself is typically regarded as
having been a strong advocate of enhanced protection of
those rights.265 In cases presenting constitutional law questions as well as in statutory interpretation cases, Rehnquist’s
opinions indeed reflect a strong inclination to protect private
property rights from intrusion by all levels of government.
In the regulatory takings cases in which he wrote opinions
addressing the merits, for example, Rehnquist sided with the
property owner and against the government every time. Indeed, when protection of private property rights came into
conflict with Rehnquist’s commitment to restricting federal
power (especially federal judicial power) or protecting state
power, he tended to sacrifice those federalism interests to
the protection of property.
263. 533 U.S. 262, 31 ELR 20725 (2001).
264. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, The Inevitable Failure of Nuisance-Based Theories of the Takings Clause: A Reply to Professor
Claeys, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 231, 232, 247 (2004) (stating that “judicial scrutiny of state and local land use practices is significantly less
deferential than it was at the inception of the Rehnquist court” and
that the Rehnquist Court “has afforded landowners significant
protections that they did not enjoy before 1986”); Percival, supra
note 12, at 10650-51 (stating that “a major part of the Rehnquist
Court’s jurisprudence has been to strengthen the constitutional protection of property rights”).
265. See, e.g., Douglas P. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and an Assessment of the Progress So Far,
25 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 509, 538 n.127 (1998) (stating that
“Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, generally regarded as among the
Court’s most conservative members, have emerged as strong advocates for greater private property protection”).
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A. Constitutional Interpretation
Justice Rehnquist’s Takings Clause opinions arose in a variety of contexts. In some of the cases, the issue was whether
the government had provided just compensation after formally invoking the power of eminent domain. In others, the
Court had to address whether the government had engaged
in a physical appropriation of property without compensating the affected property owners. In a third category of
cases, Rehnquist wrote opinions in cases in which property
owners alleged compensable regulatory takings, and the
Court disposed of those claims either on procedural grounds
or on the merits.
Rehnquist did not invariably write opinions that favored
property owners dissatisfied with their treatment at the
hands of government in the Takings Clause cases. In the two
cases involving the government’s use of the power of eminent domain, Rehnquist’s opinions favored the government.266 In each case, the issue turned on the appropriate
degree of compensation to which the condemnee was entitled. In inverse condemnation cases267 resulting from alleged physical takings, Rehnquist sided with the government twice and the property owner allegedly subject to a
taking once.268
Rehnquist’s regulatory Takings Clause opinions most
strongly reflect his commitment to the protection of private
property, even at the expense of his commitment to promoting federalism. In the cases resolved on procedural grounds
such as finality, ripeness, or the application of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause rather than on the merits of the takings
question, Rehnquist sometimes ruled for the government
and sometimes for the property owner.269 He wrote opinions
in five cases, however, in which the Court addressed either
the merits question of whether a compensable taking had occurred or, assuming that it had, the issue of what the appropriate remedy is. In all five, his opinion favored the takings
claimant. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,270 Rehnquist ruled that a
regulated landowner is entitled to pursue an inverse condemnation remedy for a temporary taking. In Dolan v. City
of Tigard,271 a regulatory exactions case, he found a taking
based on the lack of rough proportionality between the regu266. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973); Almota Farmers Elevator and Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973).
267. In an inverse condemnation action, a property owner brings suit
against the government seeking the payment of just compensation
for an alleged taking, even though the government never initiated
formal condemnation proceedings. “Such a suit is ‘inverse’ because
it is brought by the affected owner, not by the condemnor. . . . The
owner’s right to bring such a suit derives from ‘the self-executing
character of the constitutional provision with respect to condemnation. . . .’” Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 5 n.6
(1984) (quoting 6 Philip Nichols, Eminent Domain §25.41 (3d
rev. ed. 1972)).
268. United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700 (1987)
(siding with the government); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1980) (same); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 10 ELR 20042 (1979) (siding with the property owner).
269. See infra Section IV.A.2. In two cases, Rehnquist either sided with
both the government and the regulated property owner on different
issues or sided with the government while also raising doubts about
the continuing validity of precedents that favored the government.
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct.
2491 (2005); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1986).
270. 482 U.S. 304, 17 ELR 20787 (1987).
271. 512 U.S. 374, 24 ELR 21083 (1994).
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latory burden imposed on the property owner and the degree
of harm anticipated to result from her land use. In three different cases involving alleged takings based on the economic impact of regulation on affected owners, Rehnquist
wrote opinions dissenting from the majority’s conclusion
that a taking had not occurred.272
The remainder of this section explores whether there
is any doctrinal coherence to Justice Rehnquist’s
Takings Clause opinions. It analyzes his opinions in regulatory takings, eminent domain, and physical takings
cases and assesses the manner in which his Takings
Clause jurisprudence bears on his commitment to restricting federal authority to protect the environment and protecting state sovereignty over environmental and natural
resource management.
1. Justice Rehnquist’s Takings Clause Opinions
Justice Rehnquist’s regulatory takings opinions consistently
favored property owners alleging a constitutional violation.
The discussion below focuses on the aspects of Rehnquist’s
regulatory takings jurisprudence that help to explain why he
was more willing than some of his fellow Justices to find
that a regulatory taking had occurred. This subsection then
briefly describes Rehnquist’s eminent domain and physical
taking opinions, which reflect more evenhanded treatment
of property owners and the governments whose activities allegedly gave rise to violations of the Takings Clause. In
these two categories of cases, Rehnquist’s opinions emphasize the need to preclude the government from interfering
unreasonably with the legitimate expectations of takings
claimants because such uncompensated interference represents the kind of unfair treatment that the Takings Clause
was designed to forestall.
(a) Regulatory Takings Cases
Rehnquist’s regulatory takings opinions turn largely on his
resolution of the following questions: (1) how should courts
define the nature of the property interest allegedly taken for
purposes of determining the extent of the adverse impact
imposed on the regulated property?; (2) assuming that a regulation has completely destroyed the property, so defined,
how should the court determine whether the government is
absolved of the duty to compensate due to the nature of the
regulated activity?; and (3) did the regulation attacked as a
taking resemble traditional forms of land use regulation?
This subsection describes Rehnquist’s general approach to
two types of regulatory takings claims—those that did not
involve exactions and those that did. How his treatment of
important conceptual questions inclined him to rule in favor of regulatory takings claimants is discussed later in
Section C.
(1) Non-Exactions Cases
Justice Rehnquist’s regulatory takings opinions often turn
on how closely the impact of the regulation attacked as a tak272. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 533 U.S. 302, 32 ELR 20627 (2002); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 17 ELR 20440 (1987);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 8 ELR
20528 (1978).
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ing resembles a physical occupation of the regulated property; the closer the resemblance, the more likely Rehnquist
was to conclude that the government had to compensate the
regulated landowner. He first invoked this analogy as a crucial determinant in his dissent from a denial of certiorari in a
case alleging that a local rent control ordinance constituted a
taking. Rehnquist reasoned that the ordinance’s restriction
on the landlord’s ability to remove rentals from the market
“deprives [the owner] of the use of its property in a manner
closely analogous to a permanent physical occupation.”273
The ordinance resulted in a physical occupation because it
barred the landlord from evicting its tenants, with limited
exceptions not available in that case. The deprivation of the
owner’s ability to possess its property, coupled with the
evisceration of its power to exclude, rendered the application of the ordinance a taking.
Chief Justice Rehnquist returned to this mode of analysis
in two opinions he wrote in 1987.274 In Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis,275 Rehnquist dissented from the
majority’s holding that a statute restricting coal mining was
not a taking. He asserted that the Court’s precedents established that regulatory action may constitute a taking if it results in “as complete a loss as if the [government] had entered the surface and taken exclusive possession of it.”276 In
First English, where Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion
holding that a landowner whose property is temporarily
taken by regulation is entitled to a damages remedy, he
again resorted to the physical takings analogy. Rehnquist
asserted that the Court had previously required compensation for temporary physical takings because those takings
involve the same kind of denial of all use that results from
permanent takings for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.277
Finally, Rehnquist invoked the physical taking analogy in
his dissent in the 2002 case Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,278 where
he protested the majority’s conclusion that a temporary
moratorium on development pending enactment of a comprehensive land use plan was not a taking. Rehnquist disputed the significance of the distinction between temporary
and permanent deprivations. He argued that differential
treatment for the two types of deprivation is inconsistent
with the justification for the rule, enunciated in the Court’s
1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun273. Fresh Pond Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875, 876-77
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Rehnquist compared the impact on the landlord to the one that the
Court had previously declared to be a permanent physical occupation in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982). Fresh Pond Shopping Ctr., 464 U.S. at 876-77.
274. The two were Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 17 ELR 20440 (1987), and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
17 ELR 20787 (1987). Rehnquist did not write an opinion in a third
case decided that year, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483
U.S. 825, 17 ELR 20918 (1987), but he joined Justice Scalia’s majority opinion declaring an exactions scheme to be a taking.
Rehnquist endorsed Nollan and built upon its holding in finding a
taking in a later exactions case, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 24 ELR 21083 (1994). Dolan is discussed infra at Section
IV.A.1.(a)(2).
275. 480 U.S. 470, 17 ELR 20440 (1987).
276. Id. at 516 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946)).
277. First English, 482 U.S. at 318.
278. 535 U.S. 302, 32 ELR 20627 (2002).
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cil,279 that a regulation resulting in the denial of all economically beneficial use of property is a per se taking. The reason, according to Rehnquist, that the state must compensate
in Lucas-like situations is the “practical equivalence” of the
regulation with a long-term physical appropriation. In
Tahoe-Sierra, the practical effect of the moratorium was
the same as if the government had taken a lease of the landowners’ property, a situation that surely would have required compensation.280
(2) Exactions Cases
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in one of
the two cases in the 1990s in which the Court held that exactions extracted from landowners seeking permits to develop
amounted to takings.281 He held in Dolan that the requirement that a store owner dedicate strips of land for a
greenway and a pedestrian/bicycle path in return for approval of her business expansion plans worked a taking of
property.282 Although an “essential nexus” existed between
the city’s alleged goals and the conditions imposed on the
landowner, as required by Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,283 Rehnquist held that the city failed to demonstrate the requisite “rough proportionality” between the
harms alleged to result from the owner’s land use and the
burdens the exactions imposed on her.284
An important aspect of Rehnquist’s analysis was his characterization of the conditions imposed on the landowner.
They were “not simply a limitation on the use petitioner
might make of her own parcel, but a requirement that she
deed portions of the property to the city.”285 The nature of
the condition invoked the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which bars the government from requiring someone
to give up a constitutional right (such as the right to receive
just compensation) in exchange for a discretionary benefit.286 The dedication requirements in Dolan required the
regulated property owner to engage in affirmative conduct,
a factor likely to tip Rehnquist toward the conclusion that a
taking has occurred.287 Moreover, the particular conduct required—conveyance of public access easements to the
city—essentially amounted to a forced, or at least coerced,
transfer of title, which can easily be regarded as the equivalent of a physical expropriation in that it “eviscerates” the
landowner’s right to exclude.288
279. 505 U.S. 1003, 22 ELR 21104 (1992).
280. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 349 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
281. Exactions are “local government measures that require developers to
provide goods or services or pay fees as a condition to getting project
approval.” Jesse Dukeminier et al., Property 1042 (6th ed.
2006). These exactions may take the form of requirements that developers dedicate land to the local government for use as parks or for
utilities or infrastructure. See Joseph William Singer, Introduction to Property 656 (2d ed. 2005) (stating that exactions are requirements by local governments that developers of subdivisions
“provide these public improvements at their own expense as a condition for granting subdivision approval”).
282. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 24 ELR 21083 (1994).
283. 483 U.S. 825, 17 ELR 20918 (1987).
284. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 394-95.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
140, 146, 8 ELR 20528 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
288. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 394.
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Although it is not clear from the face of the opinion, Justice Blackmun’s papers reveal that Dolan raised federalism-related qualms for Rehnquist. He assigned the opinion
to himself in part as a means of establishing deferential rational basis-type review in cases alleging that exactions
amount to regulatory takings. In a draft of the opinion, the
test for assessing the legality of exactions was “whether the
extent of the exactions are reasonably related to the projected impact of the proposed development.”289 Justices
Scalia and Kennedy urged the adoption of a less deferential
test, one that required proof of a “rough proportionality” between the project’s impacts and the burdens imposed on the
landowner by the exaction. Rehnquist ultimately relented,
causing Justice Souter to dissent.290 Rehnquist’s initial support for rational basis review suggests that his commitment
to the protection of private property rights was tempered, at
least in this context, by his federalism-based commitment to
the protection of state sovereignty. In the end, however,
when he could not convince his fellow Justices that rational
basis review struck the appropriate accommodation, he
agreed to the substitution of the more intrusive rough proportionality test, thereby subordinating federalism concerns
to the desire to protect private property.
(b) Eminent Domain Cases
Justice Rehnquist wrote only two opinions in cases in which
the government had affirmatively exercised the power of
eminent domain. In both cases, he ruled in favor of the government on questions pertaining to the amount of just compensation to which the affected landowner was entitled. In
one case, the issue was whether, when the government condemned property in which the claimant held a lease, with no
right of renewal, the lessee was “entitled to receive as compensation the market value of its improvements without regard to the remaining term of its lease, because of the expectancy that the lease would have been renewed.”291 The majority concluded that the answer was yes.292 Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the majority failed to recognize the limited nature of the lessee’s interest in the condemned land.293
Although the government’s decision to condemn the fee had
turned the preexisting risk of nonrenewal into a certainty,
the government should not have to compensate for the removal of an expectancy that was not part of the property
taken in the first place.294
In the other case, Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion,
again siding with the United States on a valuation question. 295 The federal government condemned a cattle
rancher’s land. The rancher leased adjacent lands from the
federal government under a revocable permit issued under
the Taylor Grazing Act, a statute that clearly stated that
permittees acquired no rights in or title to federal land.296
289. Percival, Blackmun Papers, supra note 77, at 10656.
290. Id.
291. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409
U.S. 470, 473 (1973).
292. Id.
293. Id. at 482-83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 486-87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
295. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
296. 43 U.S.C. §315b. For discussion of the legal impact of the issuance
of a Taylor Grazing Act permit on the permittee’s property rights,
see generally 3 Coggins & Glicksman, supra note 233, §19:5.
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The rancher argued that he was entitled to the enhancement
in the value of his fee lands due to their potential use in conjunction with the federal lands covered by the permit.297
Rehnquist held, however, that the government need not
compensate for that enhanced value. Such a ruling would be
inconsistent with the principle that the government need not
compensate for elements of value it has created or that it
might have destroyed under the exercise of authority other
than the power of eminent domain.298
Rehnquist’s opinions in both cases rejected the claims for
enhanced compensation for essentially the same reason: the
condemnee had no legitimate expectation that its package of
property rights included the enhanced value so that it was
not unfair to withhold that value upon condemnation. In the
first case, the lessee consciously ran the risk when it made
improvements that its lease would not be renewed and that it
would have to forfeit the remaining value of the improvements upon nonrenewal. In the second, the Taylor Grazing
Act put the rancher on notice that a federal grazing permit
creates no property interests in the permit holder. Compensating the lessee for the value of the improvements without
regard to the remaining term of the lease would therefore
have provided it with an undeserved windfall. Compensating the rancher for the enhanced value of the fee resulting
from its proximity to land in which the rancher held a revocable federal grazing permit would have accomplished the
same result. In Rehnquist’s view, the Takings Clause requires the government to treat property owners fairly and
protect their legitimate expectations, but no more.
(c) Physical Taking Cases
Justice Rehnquist wrote opinions in three cases involving
alleged physical takings. Only one of the three opinions
sided with the takings claimant.299 In the first case, Kaiser
Aetna v. United States,300 Rehnquist’s majority opinion held
that an attempt by the Corps to prohibit a subdivision developer from barring public access to a pond it had dredged and
improved amounted to a taking. The United States argued
that public access was protected under the navigable servitude, but Rehnquist responded that the Court had never declared the navigational servitude to be a blanket exception to
the Takings Clause.301 He objected to forced public access to
the pond for several reasons. The developer’s dredging activities had linked a previously inaccessible private pond to
navigable waters. The developer had cleared all its activities
with the Corps, and Corps officials had assured it that federal permits were unnecessary. The deprivation of the developer’s right to exclude the public from the pond therefore
amounted to improper interference with its expectations. If
the government wanted to authorize a physical invasion of
the pond in the form of a public access easement, it had to
compensate the developer for transforming a private pond
into a public aquatic park.302
297. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 489.
298. Id. at 492-93.
299. Rehnquist also wrote an opinion favoring property owners in a case
involving the scope of the federal government’s statutory authority
to condemn lands allotted to Indians. United States v. Clarke, 445
U.S. 253 (1980) (construing 25 U.S.C. §357).
300. 444 U.S. 164, 10 ELR 20042 (1979).
301. Id. at 173.
302. Id. at 179-80.
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Rehnquist also wrote the majority opinion in PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins.303 The issue was whether the
owner of a private shopping center was entitled to compensation because it was required to afford access to political
protestors exercising their free speech rights. Rehnquist acknowledged that the forced access amounted to a literal taking of a portion of the right to exclude. Not every such injury, however, rises to the level of a compensable taking.
Rather, the question was whether the shopping center’s
owner was forced to bear an excessive share of burdens that
should have been borne by the public as a whole.304
Rehnquist found it “clear” that no taking had occurred because affording the access required by state law would not
unreasonably impair the use of the property as a shopping
center, the shopping center was already open to the public
(so that, presumably, the forced access requirement did not
unreasonably interfere with the owner’s legitimate expectations), and state law preserved to the owner the right to impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on the
protesters. This particular owner’s right to exclude was not
sufficiently essential to the use or economic value of the
shopping center to justify labeling the state’s restriction of it
a taking.305
The final physical taking case in which Rehnquist wrote
an opinion involved, like Kaiser Aetna, an attempt by the
federal government to assert the navigational servitude. The
issue was whether the Fifth Amendment required the United
States to pay the Cherokee Nation compensation for damage
to sand and gravel deposits caused by navigational improvements it made on the Arkansas River.306 The Court held that
it did not because the interference with the tribe’s in-stream
interests resulted from the government’s effort to regulate
uses of navigable streams. Any damages that the tribe sustained resulted not from a taking of its property, but instead
from “the lawful exercise of a power to which the interests
of riparian owners have always been subject.”307
All three cases appear to turn on the degree to which the
challenged physical taking impermissibly interfered with
the property owner’s legitimate expectations. In Kaiser
Aetna, the government gave the developer reason to believe
that it could make improvements to the pond without triggering an obligation to afford access to the public. When the
government tried to mandate access, Rehnquist ruled that it
had to pay to acquire that right. In PruneYard Shopping
Center, the fact that the center was already open to the public reduced the owner’s expectations that it could fully control the right to exclude, and the relatively minimal nature
of the intrusion represented by the presence of political
protesters made it fair to force the landowner to accommodate the interference without compensation. In United
States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma,308 the tribe’s legiti303. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
304. Id. at 82-83.
305. Id. at 83-84.
306. United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700
(1987).
307. Id. at 704. The Court also rejected the argument that the fiduciary obligations of the United States elevated the government’s action into a
taking. “[T]he tribal interests at issue here simply do not include the
right to be free from the navigational servitude, for exercise of the
servitude is ‘not an invasion of any private property rights in the
stream or the lands underlying it. . . .’” Id. at 707-08.
308. 480 U.S. 700 (1987).
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mate expectations were not upset because its rights in the
streambed had always been circumscribed by the navigational servitude, and therefore it never had the right to exclude the government.
2. Justice Rehnquist’s Takings Clause Opinions and
Federalism
The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence implicates federal-state relationships because whenever property owners
level a takings claim against the activities of state or local
government, they ask the court to use federal law to constrain state or local legislative or regulatory authority. Any
time Justice Rehnquist concluded that a state or local regulation of property amounted to a taking, as he often did, he
allowed the federal constitutional provisions protecting
private property rights to trump his normal inclination to
promote federalism by protecting state power against federal intrusion.309 Rehnquist’s Takings Clause opinions,
therefore, provide insights not only into how he viewed
the appropriate interplay between federal and state
power under the Constitution, but also into how he reconciled potential conflicts between two of his favorite
agendas—the protection of private property rights and the
promotion of federalism.
In some of the cases in which Rehnquist expressed an
opinion on the merits of a regulatory taking claim, he analyzed the roles of federal and state law in the disposition of
such claims. Rehnquist took the position in his dissenting
opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York,310 for example, that there are two exceptions to the
general principle that government activity that results in destruction of private property amounts to a compensable taking. The government “need not compensate if it imposes
prohibitions on noxious uses of property that would otherwise inflict injurious use on the community.”311 It also need
not compensate if it “prohibits a noninjurious use, but the
prohibition applies over a large cross section of land and
thereby secures an ‘average reciprocity of advantage.’”312
When he addressed the first exception in Penn Central, Justice Rehnquist appeared to engage in his own, independent
analysis of whether the use of the regulated property as a
railroad terminal qualified as a noxious use, although he did
refer to the fact that the terminal was in full compliance with
applicable zoning laws and health and safety requirements,
which were all presumably local in origin.313 Nine years
later, in his dissenting opinion in Keystone, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated explicitly that, in applying the “nuisance
exception,” the legitimacy of the regulatory authority’s purpose “is a question of federal, rather than state, law, subject
309. Cf. Percival, supra note 73, at 861 (arguing that “[o]ne of the most
striking inconsistencies in the Court’s recent jurisprudence is the
contrast between its expansion of state sovereign immunity and its
revival of regulatory takings doctrine”).
310. 438 U.S. 104, 8 ELR 20528 (1978).
311. Id. at 144-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887)).
312. Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
313. Id. at 146 (stating that “the city was not prohibiting a nuisance” and
that it did not “merely prohibit Penn Central from using its property
in a narrow set of noxious ways”).
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to independent scrutiny by this Court.”314 As Prof. Stewart
Sterk has pointed out, this position creates some tension
with the inclination among the Rehnquist Court’s conservative Justices to defer to the democratic branches of the government in some areas of constitutional law.315 This position
also has the potential to “effectively federalize much of
property law,” a result one would have thought was abhorrent to these same Justices.316
On the other hand, Rehnquist resorted to state law to determine whether a regulation resulted in destruction of the
regulated property, such that the regulation was subject to
the general principle that a regulation that results in the deprivation of all economically viable use is a per se taking. In
Penn Central, Rehnquist acknowledged the “difficult conceptual and legal problems” posed by the rule that such a
regulation is a taking.317 He noted that “the Court must define the particular property unit that should be examined” to
determine the extent of the regulation’s impact on the regulated property.318 It is possible to interpret this statement as
requiring the federal courts in which takings claims are litigated to make the determination involved in resolving this
“conceptual severance” question.319 In Keystone, however,
Rehnquist took the majority to task for failing to evaluate
the coal companies’ takings claim “by reference to the units
of property defined by state law.”320 Rehnquist asserted that
state law governs the definition of the unit of property subject to regulation because property interests are created not
by the federal Constitution, but by “independent sources
such as state law.”321 Because the subsidence act completely
extinguished the value of the coal companies’ support estate, and Pennsylvania law recognized that estate as a separate property interest, a taking had occurred.322 The dissenting opinions in Penn Central and Keystone indicate, then,
that Rehnquist conceived of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Takings Clause as the source of the rule that a complete destruction in economic value represents a compensable taking, that state law definitions of property are crucial to determining whether a regulation has resulted in such complete
destruction, and that federal law, independently fashioned
by the courts, governs the applicability of the nuisance exception to the complete destruction rule.
Rehnquist’s treatment of threshold procedural issues in
Takings Clause cases also bears on his conceptions of federalism. Most of the procedural issues raised in the regulatory
takings cases in which Rehnquist wrote an opinion related to
the finality, exhaustion, or ripeness doctrines. In San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,323 Rehnquist con314. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
512, 17 ELR 20440 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
315. See Sterk, supra note 264, at 235.
316. Id.
317. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 149 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
318. Id.
319. Rehnquist’s opinion in Penn Central is ambiguous on this point in
part because he used the passive voice. He stated that if the New
York City officials “are viewed as having restricted Penn Central’s
use of its ‘air rights,’ all return has been denied.” Id. Viewed by
whom, the Court or those who fashion New York property law? For
further discussion of the conceptual severance question, see infra
notes 362-74 and accompanying text.
320. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 518-19 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
321. Id. at 519 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
322. Id. at 519-20.
323. 450 U.S. 621, 11 ELR 20345 (1981).
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curred in the majority’s dismissal of an inverse condemnation action because of the absence of a final judgment on the
question of whether a taking had occurred.324 Rehnquist
could not formulate federal constitutional principles of
damages for land use regulation that amounts to a taking
without knowing what disposition the state courts had made
of the case.325 Similarly, in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates
v. Yolo County,326 the majority refused to reach the merits
when a property owner alleged that a local government’s rejection of its subdivision proposal required compensation.
The Court held that because the state courts had left open the
possibility that the owner could pursue some development
despite rejection of a particular plan, the local government
had not yet stated its final position on the application of the
subdivision regulations to the developer’s property.327 Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, distinguished San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. on the ground that the developer sufficiently alleged a final decision denying it all beneficial use of its property. He nevertheless refused to take a position on whether a
state may limit the remedies for a regulatory taking to declaratory and injunctive relief, preferring a remand to allow
the state courts to address the substantive question of what
remedies are available for an interim taking.328 Rehnquist
later answered that remedies question in First English, holding that the Takings Clause requires payment for the lost use
value of the land during the period that the unconstitutional
regulation was in effect.329
Like Dolan,330 First English illustrates the tension
Rehnquist sometimes perceived when forced to choose between promoting federalism or protecting private property
rights. Rehnquist’s opinion initially provided that “on the record in this case the [Takings Clause] would require compensation” for the temporary taking resulting from application of a flood control ordinance.331 He later changed the
opinion to clarify that the Court was not holding that a compensable temporary taking had occurred, but only that if it
did (a matter to be resolved in the state courts on remand),
compensation was due.332 Rehnquist’s hesitation about
whether a taking had occurred may have resulted from his
desire to minimize federal intrusion on local exercises of the
police power.
324. A final judgment is a prerequisite to Supreme Court review of the decisions of state supreme courts involving federal constitutional questions. 28 U.S.C. §1257(a).
325. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. at 636 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Similarly, in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988),
Rehnquist found that a taking claim based on the application of a
rent control statute was premature because the statute had not yet
been applied to the landowners, so that a “sufficiently concrete factual setting for the adjudication of the taking claim” was lacking.
Id. at 10.
326. 477 U.S. 340, 16 ELR 20807 (1986).
327. Id. at 352-53.
328. Id. at 364 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
329. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 17 ELR 20787 (1987). Before doing so,
he rejected the local government’s contention that the Court must
evaluate independently the adequacy of the complaint and resolve
the taking claim on the merits before reaching the remedies question.
Instead, Rehnquist assumed for purposes of his analysis of that question that the flood protection ordinance, by depriving the landowner
of all beneficial use, amounted to a temporary taking. Id. at 313.
330. See supra notes 281-90 and accompanying text.
331. Percival, Marshall Papers, supra note 12, at 10619.
332. Id.
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The final “procedural” setting addressed in a Rehnquist
Takings Clause opinion arose in a case decided during Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s last term on the Court. The issue in San
Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco333 was
whether claims brought under the Takings Clause are exempt from the full faith and credit statute.334 The majority
refused to allow the San Francisco landowners to relitigate
in federal court under the civil rights statute the merits of a
regulatory taking claim that had already been resolved adversely to them in state court.335 Rehnquist concurred. He
agreed that the full faith and credit statute barred the plaintiffs from relitigating in their federal action the issues that
had been adjudicated by the state courts. But he urged the
Court to revisit an issue it had addressed in Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson County.336 In that case, the Court, in an opinion
joined by Justice Rehnquist, held that even after a local government applies a regulatory program to real property, the
landowner must seek compensation in state court before
bringing a federal constitutional taking claim in federal
court. In San Remo Hotel, Rehnquist asserted that it was no
longer obvious to him “that either constitutional or prudential principles require claimants to utilize all state compensation procedures before they can bring a federal takings
claim.”337 He denied that “the affirmative case for the state-litigation requirement” had yet been made, and he could
not understand why the Court should “hand over authority over federal takings claims to state courts, based simply on their relative familiarity with local land-use decisions and proceedings.”338
Rehnquist’s opinions indicate that he believed that both
state and federal law have a role to play in the resolution of
regulatory takings claims. Over time, he appeared to become more comfortable with affording federal law a dominant role. For one thing, he clarified in Keystone (and perhaps even reversed his position, since his Penn Central dissent was ambiguous on the issue) that federal, not state law
governs the question of whether the nuisance exception to
the compensation requirement for complete deprivations
applies. For another, he answered the question in First English that he had agreed should be deferred in Yolo
County—the question of what remedies the Constitution requires for temporary takings, even though the state courts
had left unresolved questions in both cases.339 Finally,
Rehnquist’s opinion in San Remo Hotel indicates that he
was prepared to reverse himself on the position to which he
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005).
Id. at 2495, 2501 (citing 28 U.S.C. §1738).
Id. at 2501-02.
473 U.S. 172 (1985).
San Remo Hotel, 125 S. Ct. at 2508 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
the judgment).
338. Id. at 2509.
339. The unresolved questions, however, were different. In Yolo County,
the question was what compensation, if any, is due for a temporary
taking. In First English, the California Supreme Court had made its
position clear that an inverse condemnation remedy is not available
for a temporary taking. The state courts had not ruled, however, that
the church’s property had been taken by the application of the flood
control ordinance. Justice Stevens dissented, charging that the Court
had “unnecessarily and imprudently assume[d] that appellant’s
complaint alleges an unconstitutional taking” of the church’s campground. First English, 482 U.S. 304, 322, 17 ELR 20787 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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had adhered in Williamson County and to rule that a property owner need not exhaust state compensation procedures
as a prerequisite to filing a takings claim in federal court.
B. Statutory Construction
Justice Rehnquist’s commitment to the protection of private
property is revealed by his statutory interpretation analysis
in environmental cases, as well as by his Takings Clause
opinions. Several cases discussed above reflect Rehnquist’s
conviction that state, not federal, law should be the default
law to govern land transactions and natural resource management, in the absence of a clear congressional intent to
displace state with federal law.340 Two of those cases—Little
Lake Misere and Corvallis—also involved title disputes between either the federal government and one of its grantees
or a state and a private claimant. In both cases, Rehnquist’s
position favored protection of private property rights. This
section discusses additional cases in which Rehnquist interpreted federal natural resources legislation in a manner that
benefited private property rights.
One such case was Leo Sheep Co. v. United States.341 The
issue was whether the federal government had retained an
implied easement to build a road across land that Congress
had granted to a railroad under an 1862 statute as part of a
program to subsidize construction of the transcontinental
railroad.342 Writing for the majority, Rehnquist held that the
federal government had not reserved such an easement by
necessity. Among other things, he pointed out that the 1862
Act specifically listed reservations to the grant, but omitted
any reference to a right-of-way of the sort claimed by the
United States in the litigation. Rehnquist concluded that, “as
a matter of construing congressional intent,” the Court
should not imply a right-of-way that Congress could have
reserved explicitly if it had intended to do so.343 He emphasized “the special need for certainty and predictability
where land titles are concerned,” and the need to avoid upsetting “settled expectations” on the basis of an implicit,
“ill-defined power” to force public access over property
granted to private parties.344 Rehnquist thus resolved competing claims to natural resources between the federal government and a private landowner in favor of the latter by resorting to statutory interpretation by negative implication.
Rehnquist had an opportunity to protect private property
rights in another context in Summa Corp. v. California ex
rel. State Lands Commission.345 Los Angeles brought suit
against the owner of a lagoon that was connected to a manmade harbor, claiming that it held an easement in the lagoon
for commerce, navigation, fishing, and recreation. The city
sought to dredge and improve the lagoon without first condemning the lagoon owner’s property.346 The state supported the city’s claim, alleging that it had acquired a similar
340.
341.
342.
343.

See supra notes 218-48 and accompanying text.
440 U.S. 668 (1979).
Id. at 669.
Id. at 681-82. The Court also refused to interpret the Unlawful Inclosures Act, 43 U.S.C. §1061, which prohibits inclosures of public
lands, to apply to the landowner’s refusal to acquiesce in a public
road over its property. Leo Sheep, 440 U.S. at 684-87.
344. Id. at 687-88.
345. 466 U.S. 198, 14 ELR 20464 (1984).
346. Id. at 199-200.
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easement before conveying it to the city. The lagoon owner
argued that any servitude over the lagoon created under
Mexican law before the land was conveyed by treaty to the
United States had been forfeited by California’s failure to
assert that property interest in the federal patent proceedings
by which the federal government divested itself of title.347
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, agreed that the state’s
claim to a servitude must have been presented in the federal
patent proceeding to survive issuance of the fee patent because the property interest claimed by the city was “so substantially in derogation of the fee interest” patented to the lagoon owner’s predecessors.348 The state claimed that its failure to reserve an interest in the lagoon in the federal patent
proceeding was not determinative because its alleged public
trust servitude was a sovereign right. Rehnquist responded
that “California cannot at this late date assert its public trust
easement over [the lagoon owner’s] property, when [the
owner’s] predecessors-in-interest had their interest confirmed without any mention of such an easement taken pursuant to the Act of 1851.”349 Summa Corp. did not involve
interpretation of a federal statute. It did, however, involve
interpretation of the effect of the issuance of a land patent
by the United States pursuant to statute. It also represents a
decision in which Rehnquist was unwilling to allow a
state’s alleged public trust rights to trump private property
rights, absent an explicit exercise of the state’s rights in the
patent documents so as to put the patentee on notice of the
state’s claim.
A final case in which Rehnquist used the tools of statutory
construction to enhance private property rights was Bedroc
Ltd. v. United States.350 The issue was whether sand and
gravel qualify as “valuable minerals” reserved to the United
States in land grants issued under the Pittman Underground
Water Act of 1919.351 Rehnquist concluded that Congress’
use of the term “valuable” made it clear that sand and gravel
were not included in the statutory mineral reservation.352
“Common sense” indicated that Congress did not regard
sand and gravel found in Nevada at the time of the Act’s
adoption as “valuable minerals,” given that these substances
were abundant, had no intrinsic value, and were commercially worthless because of the state’s sparse population and
347. The lagoon owner’s title dated back to an 1839 grant by the Mexican
Governor of California to the owner’s predecessors, before California became part of the United States.
348. Summa Corp., 466 U.S. at 200-01, 205.
349. Id. at 209. The 1851 statute referred to by the Court was the source of
the federal government’s authority to issue the patent that covered
the lagoon. Id. at 205.
350. 541 U.S. 176 (2004).
351. 41 Stat. 293. Each patent issued under the Act was required to contain “a reservation to the United States of all the coal and other valuable minerals in the lands . . . , together with the right to prospect for,
mine, and remove the same.” §8, 41 Stat. at 295. Congress reserved
the rights of existing patentees when it repealed the Pittman Underground Water Act. When a successor to the original patentee began
extracting sand and gravel, the federal government concluded that he
had engaged in a trespass against the reserved interest of the United
States in the “valuable minerals” on the property. The successors
filed suit against the United States, seeking to quiet title in the sand
and gravel. Bedroc, 541 U.S. at 180-81.
352. Bedroc, 541 U.S. at 183-84. Rehnquist also relied on the Court’s precedents establishing that, in interpreting statutory mineral reservations, Congress intended the terms of a reservation to be understood
in their “ordinary and popular” sense. The “proper inquiry focuses
on the ordinary meaning of the reservation at the time Congress enacted it.” Id. at 184.
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development.353 Thus, even if sand and gravel qualified as
minerals, they did not qualify as “valuable minerals” reserved to the United States.354 Rehnquist distinguished a
previous decision holding that sand and gravel found on
lands patented under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of
1916355 were “minerals” reserved to the United States.356 He
concluded in Bedroc that the Court could not interpret the
Pittman Act’s reservation as expansively as the one in the
1916 Act because Congress “textually narrowed the scope
of the term [minerals] by using the modifier ‘valuable’” in
the Pittman Act.357
C. Discussion
That Justice Rehnquist was disposed to protect private property rights is not fairly subject to dispute. His opinions in the
eminent domain cases are not terribly revealing, indicating
only that he interpreted the Takings Clause to require fair
treatment and to preclude unreasonable governmental interference with legitimate expectations, but not to facilitate
windfall recoveries by the owners of condemned land. Likewise, Rehnquist’s opinions in cases involving alleged physical takings turned on his perception of whether the government’s activities interfered with the affected property owners’ legitimate expectations. Rehnquist’s inclination to rule
in favor of property owners and against governmental entities asserting conflicting title claims is more clearly apparent in the statutory interpretation cases discussed in the previous section. In every one of those, he construed the relevant natural resource management statutes in ways that
maximized the rights of the private property claimants.
The regulatory takings cases also reflect Rehnquist’s
commitment to the protection of private property in the face
of governmental activity alleged to adversely affect that
property. Analysis of those cases indicates that Rehnquist’s
consistently pro-property stances resulted from his resolution of several key questions: whether a regulation resulted
in a complete deprivation of all economically viable use,
whether a regulation with such an effect nevertheless did not
require compensation because of the nature of the regulated
activity, and whether the nature of the regulation itself
helped answer the question of whether a taking did or did
not occur.
One of the key questions Justice Rehnquist tackled in his
takings opinions is how to determine whether the impact of
regulation is sufficiently tantamount to a physical taking so
as to require the payment of just compensation. Rehnquist’s
inclination to decide whether a regulation amounts to a taking by assessing how closely it resembles a physical appropriation is now well entrenched in the Court’s regulatory
takings jurisprudence. In the Supreme Court’s latest regulatory takings case, Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc.,358 Justice
O’Connor stated that “the paradigmatic taking requiring just
353. Thus, the search for statutory plain meaning entailed ascertaining the
probable common meaning of the relevant term 85 years before the
Court’s decision, at the time the Pittman Underground Water Act
was adopted.
354. Bedroc, 541 U.S. at 184.
355. 43 U.S.C. §§291-302 (repealed 1976).
356. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 13 ELR 20849 (1983).
357. Bedroc, 541 U.S. at 183.
358. 125 S. Ct. 2074, 35 ELR 20106 (2005).
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compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property,” but that “government regulation of private property may, in some instances, be so
onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation
or ouster—and that such ‘regulatory takings’ may be compensable” under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.359
She added that although the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence is anything but “unified,” the principles reflected in several of the Court’s landmark cases360
share a common touchstone. Each aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates
private property or ousts the owner from his domain. Accordingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon the
severity of the burden that government imposes upon
private property rights. . . . A permanent physical invasion, however minimal the economic cost it entails, eviscerates the owner’s right to exclude others from entering
and using her property—perhaps the most fundamental
of all property interests.361

Rehnquist was unable to convince a majority of the
Court, however, that his approach to determining whether a
regulatory taking is tantamount to a physical appropriation
is the proper one. Rehnquist’s approach garnered the support of a majority of the Justices in the exactions context.
Drawing an analogy between a physical expropriation and a
regulatory requirement that a property owner dedicate its
land to public use, such as in the exactions cases, does not
require much of a stretch. The analogy between a physical
taking and a regulation that adversely affects the economic
value of the regulated property is perhaps less obvious. The
analogy is strongest if the regulation deprives the regulated
parcel of all economic value. Often, however, how to define
“the regulated parcel” is anything but obvious. Rehnquist’s
approach to this definitional question led him to conclude
that a taking had occurred in three regulatory takings cases,
but in all three, Rehnquist found himself in dissent.
Assume that a regulation prevents all economically valuable use of 10 acres of wetlands, but does not affect at all the
use of 40 other adjacent non-wetlands acres owned by the
same person. Assume also that the owner purchased both
the wetlands and non-wetlands acreage at the same time as
part of a transaction in which the entire 50 acres was conveyed to the owner as a single parcel. Should the regulation
be treated as one that deprives the owner of 100% of the
value of the 10 wetlands acres, or as one that diminishes the
value of the consolidated 50-acre tract by 20%? This question involves what is sometimes referred to as the concept of
“conceptual severance.”362 If the regulation is conceived of
359. Id. at 2081.
360. The cases she cited were Loretto (establishing that a regulation that
results in a permanent physical occupation is a per se taking), Lucas
(establishing that a regulation that deprives the owner of the regulated property of all economically viable use also is a per se taking),
and Penn Central (establishing a three-factor balancing test to assess
whether regulations that do not fit within either of the per se rules has
worked a taking).
361. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2082.
362. Prof. Margaret Radin, who originated the term, defines conceptual
severance as:
[D]elineating a property interest consisting of just what the
government action has removed from the owner, and then asserting that that particular whole thing has been permanently
taken. Thus, this strategy hypothetically or conceptually
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as completely eliminating the value of the 10-acre parcel, it
is more likely that a court will reach the conclusion that the
regulation is analogous, from the perspective of the property
owner, to a physical expropriation of the 10-acre parcel,
than if the court finds that a 20% diminution in value of the
50-acre parcel has occurred. As a result, Rehnquist’s approach to conceptual severance goes a long way toward explaining his unwavering position that the impact-based regulatory programs at issue in cases in which he wrote opinions amounted to compensable takings.
Rehnquist acknowledged the thorniness posed by the
conceptual severance issue in his dissent in Penn Central,
stating that “[d]ifficult conceptual and legal problems are
posed by a rule that a taking only occurs where the property
owner is denied all reasonable return on his property.”363 To
resolve those problems, Rehnquist recognized the need to
“define the particular property unit that should be examined,” and he criticized Justice Brennan’s majority opinion
for “do[ing] little to resolve these questions.”364 Rehnquist
himself apparently regarded the “air rights” above Penn
Central’s railroad terminal as a segregable unit of property
with an apparent value in the absence of regulation of millions of dollars.365 Whereas neighboring property owners
were free to use their air rights subject only to applicable
zoning laws, the terminal owner could not make any use of
its air rights without the approval of the agency that administered the historic preservation program, and it had already
turned down two of Penn Central’s proposed development
“severs” from the whole bundle of rights just those strands
that are interfered with by the regulation, and then hypothetically or conceptually construes those strands in the aggregate
as a separate whole thing.
Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross
Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1667,
1676 (1988). Others have framed the issue raised by assessments of
the scope of a regulation’s economic impact in terms of a “denominator” problem:
The key issue in making the takings determination in
[hypotheticals like the one posed in the text] is defining the
appropriate unit of property against which to conduct the . . .
takings inquiry. In determining whether a regulation “denies
all economically beneficial or productive use of land,” one
must do a fractional comparison between the value of the
property after the regulatory imposition (the numerator) and
the value of the property before the regulatory imposition (the
denominator). And while the fractional analysis is easy to understand, it provides no assistance in making the often crucial
determination of what unit of property will furnish the denominator value in the deprivation fraction.
Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem,
27 Rutgers L.J. 663, 666-67 (1996). See also Frank I. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1192
(1967) (“if, as seems clear, a comparison of magnitudes is intended—a comparison in which, were it fractionally expressed, the
loss in value of the affected property would compose the numerator—what value supplies the denominator? Is it the preexisting value
of the affected property, or is it the whole preexisting wealth or income of the complainant?”). In the wetlands regulation hypothetical
set forth in the text, the issue is whether the denominator should be
expressed in terms of the value of the 10 acres (which has been completely destroyed by the regulation) or the value of the 50 acres
(which has been diminished only by 20%).
363. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 149 n.13,
8 ELR 20528 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
364. Id.
365. Id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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plans.366 Rehnquist did not, however, enunciate any general
rule for resolving conceptual severance questions.
As Chief Justice, Rehnquist returned to the conceptual
severance issue in his dissent in Keystone. Once again, he
noted how nettlesome the task was, stating that “[t]he need
to consider the effect of regulation on some identifiable segment of property makes all important the admittedly difficult task of defining the relevant parcel.”367 Rehnquist disagreed with the majority’s “broad definition of the ‘relevant
mass of property.’”368 In particular, he took issue with the
majority’s conclusion that the appropriate “segment” of
property for purposes of takings analysis was the entire interest of the regulated coal companies. He concluded instead that the focus of the impact-based inquiry should have
been on the particular 27 million tons of coal that, because of
the subsidence restrictions, could not be removed.369 Rehnquist concluded that there was “no question that this coal is
an identifiable and separable property interest,” and that the
regulatory scheme completely destroyed it. From the perspective of the coal companies, the effect of the regulation
was “indistinguishable from the effect of a physical taking.”370 Rehnquist also found it important that the support
estate was recognized as a separate property interest under
Pennsylvania law. That characterization should have been
determinative in defining the denominator of the regulatory
takings equation. The majority, however, ignored the support estate as the relevant segment of property and focused
instead on “some broader, yet undefined, segment of property presumably recognized by state law.”371
Rehnquist was willing to engage in conceptual severance
on a temporal as well as a geographical basis. His characterization of the economic impact of the development moratorium in Tahoe-Sierra as “a ban on all economic development”372 resulted from his willingness to regard the time
during which the moratorium was in effect as a separate
“slice” of the owner’s fee simple absolute and to analyze the
impact of the moratorium only on that temporal slice.
Viewed in this manner, it was but a short step to the conclusion that the moratorium was the “practical equivalent” of a
physical appropriation and therefore violated the Takings
Clause.373 Thus, conceptual severance, either geographical
or temporal, was a key component of Rehnquist’s conclusion that the regulatory programs attacked as takings, based
on their economic impact, required the payment of just compensation in Penn Central, Keystone, and Tahoe-Sierra.374
366. Id. at 143 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
367. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
515, 17 ELR 20440 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
368. Id. at 514-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
369. In particular, Rehnquist thought the majority gave short shrift to the
stare decisis implications of Pennsylvania Coal, stating at conference that “Pennsylvania Coal is close and was correct,” although he
conceded that the issue “depends on the point of view—9% v. 27
million tons.” Percival, Blackman Papers, supra note 77, at 10652.
370. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 517-18 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also
id. at 514 (stating that “petitioners’ interests in particular coal deposits have been completely destroyed”).
371. Id. at 519 (Rehnquist, C.J, dissenting).
372. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 346, 352, 32 ELR 20627 (2002) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
373. Id. at 349-50 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
374. Rehnquist’s majority opinion in First English also can be interpreted
as an endorsement of temporal conceptual severance. See, e.g., Eric
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Rehnquist also recognized that the mere fact that a regulation constitutes a complete deprivation of the economic
value of the regulated segment of property, however that is
to be defined, does not necessarily dictate the conclusion
that an impact-based taking has occurred. In First English,
for example, Rehnquist assumed for purposes of analyzing the remedies question that the floodplain ordinance
amounted to a taking on the merits, but he noted that two issues remained open for resolution by the state courts on remand. The first was whether the application of the ordinance to the church’s property actually did result in a complete denial of use. Even if it did, however, the state courts
might still conclude that the ordinance did not constitute a
taking because the regulation was “insulated” from a
takings attack “as a part of the State’s authority to enact
safety regulations.”375
As early as his dissent in Penn Central, Rehnquist recognized the potential for the government’s regulatory justification to shield it from the charge that the regulation’s economic impact required it to compensate. He acknowledged
that the Court’s taking precedents recognized two exceptions to the general rule that destruction of private property
through regulation amounts to a taking. One of them comes
into play when the government adopts “a prohibition on use
of property for purposes that are declared by valid legislation to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
community; states need not compensate for prohibitions on
noxious uses of property that would otherwise inflict injurious use on the community.”376 In that situation, the government may “single out” the regulated entity because the nature of the regulated use justifies onerous treatment.377 Essentially, the target of a regulation directed at a nuisancelike use has no cause to complain, even if the economic
value of its land is destroyed, because it never had the right
to use its property in a nuisance-like manner to begin with.
How a judge defines the scope of the nuisance-like use
exception is obviously important in determining how often
he or she finds that a regulation is a taking based on its economic impact. Rehnquist defined the nuisance-like use exception narrowly. He stated in Penn Central that “[t]he nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not coterminous
with the police power itself. The question is whether the forbidden use is dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of
others.”378 That formulation is not particularly useful, however, because it says little about what constitutes such a
“danger,” particularly in the context of regulatory attempts
to protect the amorphous concept of the public “welfare.”
Rehnquist concluded that the application of New York’s historic preservation law to the railroad terminal, and in partic-

ular its refusal to allow the terminal owner to proceed with
either of its development plans, did not qualify as nuisance
prevention. Those proposals would have complied with all
applicable zoning laws and health and safety requirements.
According to Rehnquist, instead of prohibiting a noxious
use, the city forced Penn Central to preserve “an outstanding
example of beaux-arts architecture” for the benefit of sightseers and tourists.379
Even if Rehnquist was unwilling to characterize a historic
landmark preservation program as a nuisance prevention
measure, he might have been expected to consider more seriously the applicability of the nuisance-like use exception
to the regulatory program in Keystone. The state statute that
restricted mining that resulted in subsidence explicitly
billed itself as an attempt to protect the public health and
safety (as well as the environment).380 Yet, Rehnquist again
concluded that the subsidence act was not the kind of regulation that triggers the nuisance exception. He characterized
the nuisance exception as a “narrow” one that allows the
government to prevent “a misuse or illegal use.”381 Indeed,
Rehnquist asserted, the Takings Clause compels a narrow
reading of the exception because a broad reading would enable the government to enact “multifaceted health, welfare,
and safety regulations” that impose societal burdens on individual landowners as a means of securing health, safety,
and welfare benefits for the public.382 But these are the very
kinds of regulations that Rehnquist himself in Penn Central
declared to be within the scope of the nuisance exception.
Rehnquist identified “two narrowing principles” for the
nuisance exception based on previous takings cases. First,
nuisance regulations that are exempt from the obligation to
compensate must have “discrete and narrow purposes.”383
This principle disqualified the Pennsylvania statute, which
was “much more than a nuisance statute because it reflected
in part, a concern for preservation of buildings, economic
development, and maintenance of property values to sustain
the state’s tax base.”384 Rehnquist urged caution in allowing
a regulation based on “essentially economic concerns” to be
insulated from takings challenges.385 Even under his narrow
reading of the nuisance exception, however, shouldn’t
Rehnquist have at least exempted the statute to the extent
that it was based on “non-economic” concerns grounded in
the legislature’s desire to protect the public health and safety
from the adverse effects of surface coal mining?
Second, and in Rehnquist’s own words, “more significantly,” the Court had never interpreted the nuisance exception “to allow complete extinction of the value of a parcel of

R. Claeys, Takings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99
Nw. U. L. Rev. 187, 204 (2004) (stating that “First English called
Penn Central’s ‘parcel as a whole’ logic into question”).
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 313, 17 ELR 20787 (1987). In fact, on
remand, the state court found that no taking had occurred for both
reasons. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 19 ELR
21329 (1989).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 144-45, 8
ELR 20528 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The other exception
applies “when the government prohibits a noninjurious use,” but the
prohibition affords the regulated property owner an “average reciprocity of advantage.” Id. at 147.
Id. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id.

380. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
476 n.6, 17 ELR 20440 (1987).

375.

376.

377.
378.

379. Id. at 146 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

381. Id. at 512 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Curtin v. Benson,
222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911)).
382. Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
383. Id.
384. Id. Justice Blackmun’s notes on the conference for the Lucas case indicate that Rehnquist also said of the critical areas protection legislation at issue in that case that “this type of regulation is not enough to
bring the case under the nuisance line of cases.” Percival, Blackmun
Papers, supra note 77, at 10654. Rehnquist successfully counseled
Justice Scalia to modify his majority opinion to reject more emphatically the South Carolina Supreme Court’s use of the nuisance exception. Id. at 10655.
385. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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property.”386 The Court may have applied the nuisance exception to regulations that caused a substantial reduction in
value, but it had never allowed the state to completely extinguish a property interest or prohibit all use without compensating. In Keystone, according to Rehnquist, the subsidence
act completely destroyed the coal companies’ interests (defined as the particular coal deposits that had to be left in the
ground). To endorse such a regulation under the rubric of the
nuisance exception would allow the state “not merely to forbid one ‘particular use’ of property with many uses but to
extinguish all beneficial use of petitioners’ property.”387
Rehnquist’s analysis of the nuisance-like use exception in
Keystone is troublesome for many reasons. First, it seems to
mischaracterize some of the Court’s previous cases involving the exception, where the Court does appear to have endorsed regulations that resulted in total deprivations.388 Second, Rehnquist himself described the nuisance exception in
Penn Central as one that allows the destruction of private
property without triggering an obligation to compensate.389
Third, even assuming that the statute barred all other uses of
the coal companies’ property, it was directed at eliminating
risks to health and safety resulting from mining that caused
subsidence. It is not clear why the state should be precluded
from prohibiting without compensation uses that generate
adverse health and environmental effects, just because those
are the only uses to which the land may profitably be put. At
any rate, Rehnquist’s increasingly narrow conception of the
nuisance-like use exception390 is a second key determinant
of his willingness to endorse takings challenges based on the
adverse economic impact of regulation.391
Athird important component of Rehnquist’s takings analysis in non-exactions cases was his focus on whether a regulation challenged as a taking took the form of familiar or traditional land use regulation.392 In First English, Rehnquist
386. Id.
387. Id. at 514 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
388. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887).
389. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 144-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
390. According to at least one observer, Rehnquist’s position essentially
boiled down to the view that nuisance control (as he narrowly defined it) was “the only permissible basis for land use regulation.”
Sterk, supra note 264, at 233.
391. Although Rehnquist did not explicitly analyze the moratorium in
Tahoe-Sierra to determine whether it might trigger the nuisance-like
use exception, he probably would have concluded that it did not,
based on both of the “narrowing principles” enunciated in Keystone.
First, it is unlikely that he would have regarded the regulation as
based on the kind of “discrete and narrow” purposes to which he referred in Keystone. Rehnquist characterized the lake in Tahoe-Sierra
as “a national treasure,” and did not question that the government’s
efforts at preventing its further degradation “were made in good faith
in furtherance of the public interest. But, as is the case with most governmental action that furthers the public interest, the Constitution requires that the costs and burdens be borne by the public at large, not
by a few targeted citizens.” Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 354, 32 ELR 20627
(2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Second, once Rehnquist engaged in temporal conceptual severance—by treating the time during which the development moratorium was in effect as a separate
and identifiable slice of property for takings analysis purposes—it
was foreordained that he would conclude that the regulation completely destroyed the regulated property’s value.
392. Cf. David A. Myers, Some Observations on the Analysis of Regulatory Takings in the Rehnquist Court, 23 Val. U. L. Rev. 527, 551
(1989) (arguing that, for Rehnquist, “conventional perceptions of
property rights are a primary focus” and that “[c]ommon law distri-
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held that the government must compensate for the lost use
value of a regulation declared to be a taking while the regulation (in that case, a moratorium on development within a
floodplain) was in effect. He distinguished the adverse impact resulting from “normal delays” in obtaining building
permits, zoning changes, or variances, which typically do
not require compensation.393 Similarly, Rehnquist contended in Tahoe-Sierra that compensation was owed because a moratorium on development pending enactment of a
comprehensive land use plan “does not resemble any traditional land-use planning device.”394
This device for sorting out regulations that require compensation from those that do not helps explain why Rehnquist uniformly sided with property owners in the regulatory takings cases in which he wrote an opinion. The three
non-exactions cases in which Rehnquist filed a dissent—Penn Central, Keystone, and Tahoe-Sierra—all involved environmental or similar regulatory schemes that
probably did not conform to Rehnquist’s conception of what
“normal” or “traditional” land use regulation ought to look
like. Penn Central involved historic preservation legislation,395 Keystone involved a program restricting coal mining
to minimize environmental damage, and the regulatory
scheme at issue in Tahoe-Sierra sought to protect environmentally “sensitive lands” and to halt the environmental
degradation that development near Lake Tahoe had caused
to the lake’s “unsurpassed beauty.”396 Rehnquist, therefore,
was likely to be sympathetic to regulatory takings attacks
that were leveled against modern environmental regulatory
regimes, which he apparently regarded as somehow representing a departure from more “acceptable,” or at least more
traditional, forms of land use regulation such as Euclidean
zoning. The government may well have the authority to
adopt such newfangled regulatory programs, but if they do
so in a way that results in significant economic harm to those
regulated, they must be prepared to compensate adversely
affected entities. Perhaps Rehnquist’s distaste for nontraditional regulation that adversely affects economic value
stemmed from his focus on the degree to which regulation
impermissibly interferes with reasonable investmentbacked expectations: landowners are more likely to anticipate “normal” or “traditional” land use regulation than the
kinds of environmental regulations at issue in Penn Central,
Keystone, and Tahoe-Sierra.397
Similarly, Rehnquist’s opinion in Dolan is reminiscent of
his invocation of the distinction between “normal” or “tradi-

393.

394.
395.

396.
397.

butions of rights in land are accepted as natural and legislative decisions to alter these rights are viewed with suspicion”).
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321, 17 ELR 20787 (1987) (emphasis added).
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 343 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun’s Supreme Court papers indicate that, at the conference on Penn Central, Rehnquist distinguished zoning from New
York City’s historic landmark program on the ground that “[i]n zoning, there is a benefit that accompanies the burden,” whereas the terminal owner in Penn Central received no such benefit. Percival,
Blackmun Papers, supra note 77, at 10651.
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 307, 312.
Rehnquist, however, joined Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 32 ELR 20516 (2001), in
which the Court held that the fact that a property owner purchased
the property after the enactment of the regulatory program being
attacked does not necessarily bar the owner from asserting a taking claim.
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tional” and novel land use restrictions in the cases alleging
impact-based takings. He again differentiated the land use
controls upheld in the face of previous constitutional attacks
from the exaction requirements at issue in Dolan. In past
cases, the Court had addressed “essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city,” while in
Dolan, “the city has made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual parcel.”398 Rehnquist appears to have been more concerned about that kind of adjudicative decision, perhaps because it enhances the risk that the affected property owner
has been “singled out” to bear burdens that should have been
borne by the public as a whole.
The most striking aspect of Justice Rehnquist’s Takings
Clause jurisprudence is his consistent willingness to find
takings based on regulation, whether he regarded the fatal
aspect of the regulation to be its endorsement of a government-sponsored physical invasion (in the nature of an easement) or the excessive economic impact of the regulation.
Rehnquist’s opinions repeatedly echo themes that he regarded as fundamental to the purposes of requiring just
compensation for government takings of private property
for a public use. These include the importance of fair treatment of property owners so that they are not inappropriately
singled out to bear burdens that should have been imposed
on society at large, protecting the right to exclude because it
is one of the most fundamental sticks in the property
owner’s bundle of rights, avoiding the imposition of affirmative obligations in the absence of compensation, and protecting the legitimate investment-backed expectations of
property owners.
Rehnquist’s invocation of these themes may not be
enough to explain his failure to ever write an opinion siding
against a regulatory takings claimant on the merits. The same
themes apply in the context of eminent domain and physical
taking cases, and yet Rehnquist’s treatment of governmental
and landowner litigants seems to have been fairly evenhanded. It is only in the regulatory takings arena that Rehnquist’s opinions are so lopsidedly pro-property owner. Two of
the most important determinants in regulatory takings cases
are the definitions he adopted of the relevant property interest
affected by regulation (the conceptual severance question)
and of the category of activities that may be regulated without
triggering liability under the Takings Clause (the nuisance-like use exception). Rehnquist’s positions on both issues were heavily weighted in favor of regulated landowners,
so much so that he ruled for them at every opportunity.
V. Conclusion
Rehnquist’s resolution of constitutional and statutory issues
in environmental law cases reflects his dedication to the imposition of limitations on congressional power, the protection of state sovereignty, and the protection of private property rights. He almost single-handedly reinvigorated the
Commerce Clause as a tool for restricting federal power to a
greater degree than the Supreme Court had endorsed for
many decades. He consistently rejected preemption attacks
that had the potential to narrow the scope of traditional state
regulatory authority over natural resource management.
Rehnquist advocated expansion of the Takings Clause under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, with mixed results,
398. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385, 24 ELR 21083 (1994).
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and interpreted natural resource management legislation to
protect private property rights at the expense of both federal
and state governments.
Some portions of Rehnquist’s agenda seem inherently
anti-environmental, even if hostility to environmental regulation was not the motivating factor behind Rehnquist’s jurisprudence. Expansive interpretations of the obligation to
compensate landowners adversely affected by regulation
inevitably will limit the government’s ability to impose environmental restrictions. Similarly, a commitment to the imposition of limitations on federal power, either through narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause or of the scope
of regulatory authority delegated to agencies by federal environmental statutes, is likely to manifest itself in a series of
decisions that impair the federal government’s ability to
protect the environment. Rehnquist’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence may yet result in significant restrictions on
Congress’authority to enact laws that protect resources such
as wetlands and endangered species or in judicial adoption
of narrow constructions of such laws to avoid perceived
constitutional federalism questions.
Other portions of Rehnquist’s agenda are not necessarily
anti-environmental in orientation. The protection of state
sovereignty has the potential to enhance state regulatory authority in environmental matters. If, however, Rehnquist’s
commitment to the protection of state sovereignty were selective, it would be fair to impart an anti-environmental animus to his jurisprudence. To the extent that some of his opinions find preemption of state efforts to adopt more stringent
environmental regulation than the federal government has
enacted, he is susceptible to this charge. Moreover, even if
Rehnquist consistently pursued both his federalism and
property rights agendas, the two agendas on occasion come
into conflict. Rehnquist’s opinions appear to reconcile that
conflict more often than not by favoring the protection of
property rights. That method of accommodating the need to
protect both state sovereignty and property rights is prone to
yield anti-environmental results, given that environmental
regulation often restricts the use of property. Rehnquist’s
opinions sided with the regulatory takings claimant and
against the governmental entity that adopted environmental
regulatory measures in each case in which a clash between
these two interests arose. His opinions often took the form
of dissents, however. He was unable to convince a majority
of the Justices to conform to his approach to issues such as
conceptual severance.
In one area, Justice Rehnquist’s commitment to the protection of state sovereignty induced him to take a firmly proenvironmental stance. Rehnquist repeatedly invoked the
rights of the states to protect their own natural resources
from external threats to conclude that state and local measures designed to avoid environmental harm through restrictions on the flow of or disposal of waste did not violate
the dormant Commerce Clause. This commitment to the
preservation of state power to protect threatened resources
from out-of-state threats had no discernible impact, however. Rehnquist always found himself in dissent on dormant Commerce Clause issues, and often exclusively so.
The strongest pro-environmental component of Rehnquist’s jurisprudence thus has had far less impact than the
components that have had the effect of dismantling important aspects of modern environmental law, either by design
or effect.

